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INTRODUCTION
A number of technological and political forces have transformed the once
staid and insider dominated notice-and-comment process into a forum for
large scale, sometimes messy, participation in regulatory decisionmaking. It
is not unheard of for agencies to receive millions of comments on
rulemakings; often these comments are received as part of organized mass
comment campaigns.1 In some rulemakings, questions have been raised
about whether public comments were submitted under false names,2 or were
1. See Steven J. Balla, Alexander R. Beck, Elizabeth Meehan & Aryamala Prasad, Lost in
the Flood?: Agency Responsiveness to Mass Comment Campaigns in Administrative Rulemaking, REGUL. &
GOVERNANCE, May 2020, at 1 (exploring 1,049 mass comment campaigns occurring during
twenty-two Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) rulemakings from 2012 to 2017); Rachel
Augustine Potter, More than Spam?: Lobbying the EPA Through Public Comment Campaigns,
BROOKINGS INST. (Nov. 19, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/research/more-than-spamlobbying-the-epa-through-public-comment-campaigns/.
2. In this paper, we refer to comments submitted under false names as “malattributed”
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automatically generated by computer “bot” programs.3
The Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC’s) “Restoring Internet
Freedom” (i.e., net neutrality) rulemaking perhaps best illustrates the new
challenges posed to the notice-and-comment process. That proposed rule
attracted a record number of public comments: almost twenty-two million
by the official close of the comment period, with another three million
arriving after the fact.4 Although about six percent of the comments were
unique, the rest were submitted multiple times, in some cases hundreds of
thousands of times.5 On nine different occasions, more than seventy-five
thousand comments were entered into the docket at the very same second.6
The submissions “included comments from stolen email addresses, defunct
email accounts and people who unwittingly gave permission for their
comments to be posted.”7 A consulting firm later determined that about a
comments. In popular usage, the terms “fraudulent” and “fake” are often used to describe
these types of comments. Those terms are often used in a way that is overinclusive, however,
as comments can contain false information other than the name of the commenter. Since we
are here concerned only with comments containing inaccurate names, we will use the more
precise term “malattributed” except when quoting a source that uses another term.
3. Fake It Till They Make It: How Bad Actors Use Astroturfing to Manipulate Regulators,
Disenfranchise Consumers, and Subvert the Rulemaking Process: Hearing Before the H. Fin. Servs. Comm.,
116th Cong. 1–2, 5, 13 (2020) [hereinafter Fake It Till They Make It].
4. In 2015, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) issued its “net neutrality”
rule, prohibiting broadband Internet providers from blocking, degrading, or interfering with
Internet traffic. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 80 Fed. Reg. 19,737, 19,739–
40 (June 12, 2015) (codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 1, 8, 20). The rule was upheld in United States
Telecom Ass’n v. FCC. U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 689 (D.C. Cir. 2016). In
2017, the FCC proposed repealing the 2015 rule. Restoring Internet Freedom, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 32 FCC Rcd. 4434 (2017). The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking was released
in May and published in the Federal Register in June. 82 Fed. Reg. 25,568 (June 2, 2017). The
Final Rule was promulgated in early January 2018. Restoring Internet Freedom, 83 Fed.
Reg. 7852 (Feb. 22, 2018) (codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 1, 8, 20). For information on the
comments, see Paul Hitlin, Kenneth Olmstead & Skye Toor, Public Comments to the Federal
Communications Commission About Net Neutrality Contain Many Inaccuracies and Duplicates, PEW RES.
CTR. 2, 12–13 (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/wp-content/uploads
/sites/9/2017/11/PI_2017.11.29_Net-Neutrality-Comments_FINAL.pdf.
5. Hitlin supra note 4, at 3 (“Of the 27.1 million comments posted, 6% were unique. The
other 94% were submitted multiple times.”).
6. Id.
7. James V. Grimaldi & Paul Overburg, Millions of People Post Comments on Federal
Regulations. Many Are Fake., WALL ST. J. (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/art
icles/millions-of-people-post-comments-on-federal-regulations-many-are-fake-1513099188.
A video on the newspaper’s website summarizes: “[T]he Wall Street Journal uncovered
thousands of comments from fake email addresses, abandoned or defunct email accounts,
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third of the comments were sent from temporary or disposable email
domains, and about ten million were from senders of multiple comments. 8
FCC Commissioner Jessica Rosenworcel has stressed that five hundred
thousand or so comments came from Russia.9 The New York Attorney
General concluded that 9.3 million comments were what this Article refers
to as “malattributed”—submitted under false identities—including over
seven million from a single submitter.10 In sum, three forms of public
participation in this rulemaking raised concerns: 1) the mass occurrence of
identical and near duplicate comments, 2) the malattribution of identities,
and 3) the apparent automation of comment submission. 11
With its new higher profile and an emerging set of technological challenges,
the notice-and-comment process has come under increasing scrutiny. In 2019
the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations issued a staff
report entitled, “Abuses of the Federal Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking
Process.”12
The report identified problems associated with mass,
malattributed, and computer-generated comments, including a lack of agency
processes and policies aimed at identifying, managing, and addressing such

posted on behalf of unwitting participants. For example, 818,000 identical comments on the
FCC site favor repealing the rules. In a random sample of people whose emails were used for
those posts, 72% said they had nothing to do with them. Jack Hirsch was one of them. ‘I was
horrified. Knowing that this is actually an issue that I cared enough to write my
representatives about, and knowing that my information had been falsified to support a
completely opposing view, it was really frustrating, and honestly, I felt like there was no
recourse.’” Thousands of Fake Comments on Net Neutrality: A WSJ Investigation, WALL ST. J. (Dec.
12, 2017, 12:02 PM), https://www.wsj.com/video/thousands-of-fake-comments-onnetneutrality-a-wsj-investigation/8E52172E-821C-4D89-A2AA-2820F30B8648.html.
8. FCC Restoring Internet Freedom Docket 17-108: Comments Analysis, EMPRATA 2 (Aug. 30,
2017), https://www.emprata.com/emp2017/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/FCC-Restorin
g-Internet-Freedom-Comments-Analysis.pdf.
9. Nicholas Confessore and Jeremy Singer-Vine on Request for Inspection of Records, 33 FCC
Rcd. 11808 (adopted Nov. 7, 2018) (statement of Commissioner Jessica Rosenworcel, dissenting).
10. N.Y. STATE OFF. OF THE ATT’Y GEN. LETITIA JAMES, FAKE COMMENTS: HOW U.S.
COMPANIES & PARTISANS HACK DEMOCRACY TO UNDERMINE YOUR VOICE 6 (2021),
https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/oag-fakecommentsreport.pdf; see also Letter from Eric
Schneiderman, Att’y Gen., N.Y., to Thomas M. Johnson, Jr., Gen. Counsel, FCC (Dec. 13,
2017), https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/ltr_to_fcc_gen_counsel_re_records_request.pdf
(noting eight million comments filed under false identities) (encouraging Mr. Thomas Johnson,
Jr. to postpone the vote based on the possibility of damage to the FCC’s reputation).
11. See JAMES, supra note 10.
12. Joint Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations & the Subcomm. on Regul. Affs. & Mgmt.
of the Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affs., 116th Cong. (2019) (Staff Report, Abuses of the
Federal Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking Process) [hereinafter Joint Hearing Subcommittee Report].
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comments.13 The Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) has
also been tracking these issues for several years.14 This attention is partly
because all three of these types of comments can generate serious challenges
for agencies, raising a pressing set of questions concerning how best to respond
while ensuring the functioning of the informal rulemaking process.15
In this Article, we examine whether and to what extent such submissions
are problematic and make recommendations for how rulemaking agencies
should respond as a matter of law, policy, and technology. Our overarching
conclusion is that agencies should adopt both low- and high-tech measures
to limit the negative impact of these sorts of comments. Mass, malattributed,
and computer-generated comments, however, do not represent a crisis for
the regulatory state at this time. They have not been found to violate federal
law and do not generally undermine the integrity of notice-and-comment
rulemaking, and we are not aware of evidence of widespread substantive harms
in particular rulemaking efforts or to the rulemaking system overall. However,
appropriate responses, especially those that take advantage of new technology,
could reduce the cost and negative impacts of technology-enabled comments.
Adopting such techniques could, for example, improve the opportunity
for a diverse public to participate in the federal rulemaking process
meaningfully and augment current practices with new forms of citizen
engagement. Indeed, in addition to exploring how new technologies—
the very same technologies that enable mass, malattributed, and
computer-generated comments—can help with analyzing those
comments, we also explore throughout how technology can help
regulatory officials make sense of public input and draw greater insights
from public comments of all kinds. Finally, other jurisdictions at the state
and local level and internationally are turning to new technology to
enable innovative forms of public participation, thus improving the
quality of rule and policymaking. These activities illustrate hopeful
opportunities for future experimentation.
13. Id. at 68–69.
14. See Matthew Wiener, Vice Chairman & Executive Director, Admin. Conf. of the
U.S., Introductory Remarks at the Administrative Conference of the United States and
Administrative Law Review Symposium: Mass and Fake Comments in Agency Rulemaking
14 (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/10-5-18%20Mas
s%20and%20Fake%20Comments%20in%20Agency%20Rulemaking%20Transcript.pdf.
15. Journalistic and popular attention has focused on comments that fall into all three
categories simultaneously, i.e., mass computer-generated malattributed comments. But these
three distinct characteristics do not necessarily coincide. Each presents distinct practical and
normative issues. While this Article examines all three types of comments, it is careful to
disaggregate them and take into account the important ways in which they differ. These three
types of comments are defined in further detail below.
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This Article is based on a report submitted by the authors to the ACUS
and is informed by a set of interviews during the summer and fall of 2020
with agency personnel with a background in the rulemaking process at
agencies with substantial rulemaking dockets. The interviews, which were
not meant to capture the views of a representative or random sample, were
with staff of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau, the Department of Transportation, and the
FCC, as well as with officials from the General Services Administration
(GSA) responsible for developing and maintaining the Federal Docket
Management System (FDMS). A technical advisory group of experts drawn
from government, private industry, and academia also provided feedback to
the authors, as did an additional online roundtable of agency officials with
experience in the notice-and-comment process.
This Article is divided into seven parts. Part I provides a general
introduction to notice-and-comment rulemaking and the role of technology
in that process. Part II discusses recent technological developments that have
contributed to the growth of mass, malattributed, and computer-generated
comments, and describes some of the challenges associated with these types
of comments. Parts III, IV, and V focus on each of these comment types in
turn. Part VI discusses technological opportunities, with a focus on current,
available tools that can be used to facilitate the processing of information
from the notice-and-comment process or enhance supplements to the noticeand-comment process. Part VII concludes.
I.TECHNOLOGY AND NOTICE-AND-COMMENT RULEMAKING
During the latter half of the twentieth century, there was considerable
growth in the use of informal rulemaking by administrative agencies.16 A
cornerstone of the informal rulemaking process is the opportunity for
members of the public to submit comments on rulemaking proposals,17
which is why it is often referred to as notice-and-comment rulemaking. For
decades, organizations and individuals have been able to use this opportunity
to help inform the process of regulatory development.18 Public comments on
agency rulemakings take a wide variety of forms that include detailed
16. See Christopher DeMuth, Can the Administrative State Be Tamed?, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS
121, 125–27 (2016).
17. Cary Coglianese, Citizen Participation in Rulemaking: Past, Present, and Future, 55 DUKE
L.J. 943, 945 (2006); see also Beth Simone Noveck, The Electronic Revolution in Rulemaking, 53
EMORY L.J. 433, 517 (2004) (“Participation in rulemaking is one of the most fundamental,
important, and far-reaching of democratic rights”).
18. Michael A. Livermore, Vladimir Eidelman & Brian Grom, Computationally Assisted
Regulatory Participation, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 977–78 (2018).
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submissions by sophisticated repeat players, short expressions of support or
opposition from members of the public, signed form letters in response to
solicitations from non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and technical
reports from unaffiliated experts.19
There is considerable variation in the level of public participation from
one rulemaking to another. The vast majority of rulemakings are relatively
unremarked upon by the public, with—at most—participation by the
stakeholders most affected by a rule.20 This level of participation is not
surprising given the often highly technical and specialized nature and low
visibility of many rulemakings. Although federal agencies publish the
opportunity to participate in the Federal Register (effectively, the newspaper of
the federal government), they often do not advertise rulemakings elsewhere
and the public tends to have little knowledge of their ability to engage unless a
third party promotes the opportunity. In a small percentage of well-publicized
rulemakings with particular public salience—such as those highlighted
above—public participation can be orders of magnitude above the norm, with
the number of comments ranging from thousands to millions.21
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) sets forth the key elements of
notice-and-comment rulemaking in § 553.22 Subject to certain exceptions,
agencies first must publish a general notice of the proposed rulemaking in
the Federal Register.23 That notice “shall include—
(1) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule making
proceedings;
(2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed; and
19. See id. at 977–78 (stating public participation in the notice-and-comment rulemaking
process has increased drastically due to the flexible and simple process).
20. David M. Shafie, Participation in E-Rulemaking: Interest Groups and the Standard-Setting
Process for Hazardous Air Pollutants, 5 J. INFO. TECH. & POL. 399, 403–405 (2008); see also Stuart
Shapiro, When Do Agencies Change Their Proposed Rules (Nov. 10, 2007) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1026066 (finding that fewer than
10% of rulemakings received more than 100 comments); John M. de Figueiredo, E-Rulemaking:
Bringing Data to Theory at the Federal Communications Commission, 55 DUKE L.J. 969 (2006). Other
agency actions that are subject to public commenting follow as similar pattern. An analysis
focusing on the fifty draft guidance documents published for public comment by the EPA from
2011–2014 found that just eight received more than 5,000 comments, with five exceeding
40,000 comments. Nicholas R. Parrillo, Should the Public Get to Participate Before Federal Agencies
Issue Guidance? An Empirical Study, 71 ADMIN. L. REV. 57, 97–98 (2019) [hereinafter Parrillo,
Should the Public Get to Participate]; NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, FEDERAL AGENCY GUIDANCE: AN
INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 160 (Oct. 12, 2017) (report to the Admin. Conf. of the U.S.).
21. See supra notes 4–10 and accompanying text.
22. 5 U.S.C. § 553.
23. Id. § 553(b).
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(3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of
the subjects and issues involved.”24
The APA further provides that “[a]fter notice required by this section,
the agency shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate in
the rule making through submission of written data, views, or arguments
with or without opportunity for oral presentation. After consideration of
the relevant matter presented, the agency shall incorporate in the rules
adopted a concise general statement of their basis and purpose.” 25
“[P]erson” is broadly defined to include “an individual, partnership,
corporation, association, or public or private organization other than an
agency.”26 Consistent with the broad ideals underlying the commenting
process, courts read this provision expansively. 27 Courts have also
elaborated that the purpose of the notice requirement is to facilitate
meaningful comments. 28 For example, agencies must disclose in their
notice any scientific or technical details on which they base their proposed
rules to give the public a fair opportunity to react and comment thereon. 29
Agencies not only must provide notice and an opportunity for public
comments but also must then “consider[] . . . the relevant matter
presented” in those comments. 30 The courts have interpreted this
language to require that, in the notice of the final rule, agencies respond
to “significant” comments—those that, “if true . . . would require a
change in [the] proposed rule.”31 Failure to so respond is grounds for
remand.32 Under § 706(2)(A) of the APA, agency rulemakings will be set
aside if they are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or

24. Id.
25. Id. § 553(c).
26. Id. § 551(2).
27. E.g., O’Rourke v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 684 F. Supp. 716, 718 (D.D.C. 1988) (holding “person”
includes non-citizens and collecting cases); Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Kissinger, 385 F. Supp. 769,
776 (D.D.C. 1974) (holding that a foreign government or instrumentality thereof is a “person”).
28. Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
29. Id.
30. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
31. Am. Mining Cong. v. EPA, 907 F.2d 1179, 1188 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (citations
omitted); Home Box Off., Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 35–36 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
Without such an obligation, courts have said, the opportunity to comment would be
“meaningless.” Id. at 35; see Carlson v. Postal Regul. Comm’n, 938 F.3d 337, 351 (D.C.
Cir. 2019); Am. Civ. Liberties Union v. FCC, 823 F.3d 1554, 1581 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per
curiam); St. James Hosp. v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 1460, 1470 (7th Cir. 1985).
32. E.g., La. Fed. Land Bank Ass’n v. Farm Credit Admin., 336 F.3d 1075, 1080, 1085
(D.C. Cir. 2003).
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otherwise not in accordance with law.”33 The failure to acknowledge and
respond to substantive concerns raised in the rulemaking process is one
of the grounds for a court to find that an agency’s rulemaking fails under
the arbitrary or capricious standard.34
Although the requirement to respond to comments is serious, it is not
absolute. The “APA requirement of agency responsiveness to comments is
subject to the common-sense rule that a response [is not always] necessary.”35
Comments that “are purely speculative and do not disclose the factual or
policy basis on which they rest require no response.”36
In recognition of the potential for information and communication
technologies to facilitate broader participation in the regulatory process, the
E-Government Act was signed into law in December 2002.37 Among other
things, the George W. Bush Administration established the eRulemaking
Program to spearhead the creation of an online system for conducting the
notice-and-comment process at agencies throughout the federal
government.38 To the extent deemed practicable, each agency must post
information required to be published in the Federal Register online, maintain
online rulemaking dockets, and allow for electronic submission of comments
accepted under § 553(c).39 To better facilitate this public online access,
Regulations.gov was created in January 2003.40 All executive agencies were
required to join the eRulemaking Program.41 As of this writing, many but

33. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). This is known as the “arbitrary and capricious” standard. An
agency rule will be arbitrary and capricious if the rule relies on factors that Congress has not
intended it to consider, entirely fails to consider an important aspect of the problem, offers an
explanation for its decision in conflict with the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible
that it cannot be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise. Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42–47 (1983).
34. See, e.g., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1152 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (discussing
agency failure to address cost issues raised in comments).
35. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 859 F.2d 156, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (per curiam).
36. Home Box Off., Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 35 n.58 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (per curiam); see
also Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. FAA, 988 F.2d 186, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
37. E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–347, 116 Stat. 2899 (2002) (codified at
44 U.S.C. § 3501).
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. Regulations.gov was initially managed by the EPA. See About the eRulemaking Initiative,
REGULATIONS.GOV, https://www.regulations.gov/about (last visited Feb. 8, 2022). The
General Services Administration (GSA) assumed the role of managing partner of the
eRulemaking Program at the beginning of October 2019. Id.
41. Cynthia R. Farina, Achieving the Potential: The Future of Federal E-Rulemaking (2009), 62
ADMIN. L. REV. 279, 282 (2009).
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not all independent agencies also use Regulations.gov for their rulemakings;
those that do not prominently include the FCC and the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC).42
Notice-and-comment rulemaking remains a central mechanism for public
participation in agency policymaking.43 The adoption of e-rulemaking by
agencies, along with broader associated technological developments, has led
to fundamental changes in notice-and-comment rulemaking. What was once
a paper process that was difficult to access and generally dominated by a
small number of repeat players has become more visible and therefore more
accessible. The elimination of barriers to participation has brought with it
meaningful change. Much of this is for the better. The move online has
increased participation, made for better-informed agencies, made
rulemaking more transparent, and provided commenters, stakeholders, and
rule writers within the agencies with easier access to materials in the docket.
It has also enabled certain forms of commenting that lack obvious benefits
and that may do affirmative harm. The remainder of this Article examines
these opportunities and challenges.
II.THE NEW WORLD OF TECHNOLOGY-ENABLED COMMENTS
For much of its history, the APA’s notice-and-comment process typically
involved a particular form of commenting: an individual or entity with “data,
views, or arguments” relevant to the draft rule produced a bespoke comment

42. A complete list of participating and nonparticipating agencies appears on the
Regulaltions.gov website,
https://www.regulations.gov/agencies.
See Agencies,
R EGULATIONS . GOV, https://www.regulations.gov/agencies (last visited Feb. 8, 2022).
43. Filing comments, electronically or by mail, is not the only way that individuals and
organizations may participate in agency rulemaking. Agencies also occasionally hold public
hearings, consult with experts in advisory committees, and work with interest group
stakeholders in negotiated rulemakings. The Negotiated Rulemaking Act encouraged
agencies to use a dispute resolution process for soliciting stakeholder comments to enhance
the informal rulemaking process. See Negotiated Rulemaking Act, 5 U.S.C. § 561; see also
Administrative Conference Recommendation 2017–2, Negotiated Rulemaking and Other
Options for Public Engagement, 82 Fed. Reg. 31,040, 31,040–41 (June 16, 2017) (noting the
infrequent use of negotiated rulemaking and suggesting that this is due to the availability of
other avenues for public engagement including informal rulemaking, requests for input,
technical workshops, and listening sessions—methods which provide agencies greater
procedural flexibility). Public participation also occurs after-the-fact through intervention in
agency adjudications, citizens and groups’ informal monitoring activities, and litigation. See
Cary Coglianese, Heather Kilmartin & Evan Mendelson, Transparency and Public Participation in
the Federal Rulemaking Process: Recommendations for the New Administration, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
924, 943–46 (2009) (discussing alternative ways agencies are held accountable for rulemaking).
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that reflected that individual’s or entity’s expertise or concerns.44 One
person, one comment, and every comment made a unique contribution
because it was from a unique submitter.
The three sorts of technology-enabled comments addressed in this Article
do not fit this model. Many commentators believe that this departure from
the past is a problem. One example: the U.S. Senate Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations’ 2019 report pointed to a variety of issues
associated with mass, malattributed, and computer-generated comments.45
It saw these types of comments as contributing to “abuses” that “reduce[]
the effectiveness of the notice-and-comment process; cost[] taxpayer funds to
mitigate; allow[] identity theft-related crimes to go unaddressed; and leave[]
the rulemaking process vulnerable to disruptive activity.”46
The widespread outrage caused by FCC’s net neutrality rulemaking—with
its massive total number of comments as well as malattributed and computergenerated comments—suggests that technology-enabled comments may be a
major problem; but, as we shall explore, the challenges are surmountable.
We begin this section with a taxonomy—identifying the particular sort of
commenting activity that is our focus. We then turn to a discussion of the
overall issues that these sorts of comments raise. In the following sections,
we consider each of the three types of comments in particular.
A. Three Types of Technology-Enabled Comments
1. Mass Comments
In a relatively small number of rulemakings, agencies receive an unusually
large number of comments (e.g., hundreds or thousands, as opposed to the
few dozen, or fewer, that are typical).47 We designate such situations as a
“mass comment response.” We do not define a specific threshold for the
number of comments to qualify as a mass comment response, as the threshold
44. Michael Herz, “Data, Views, or Arguments”: A Rumination, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
351, 357 (2013).
45. See Joint Hearing Subcommittee Report, supra note 12, at 2–3, 16–17. The report also
highlighted other issues with comments such as the inclusion of obscenity and copyrighted
materials. Id. at 30–31.
46. Id. at 1.
47. See Coglianese, supra note 1717, at 953–54 (providing examples of rulemakings that
have received large volume of comments); Review of E-Rulemaking Comment Systems: Joint Hearing
Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations & the Subcomm. on Regul. Affs. & Mgmt. of the S. Comm.
on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affs., 116th Cong. 2 at 9 (2019) (statement of Dominic J.
Mancini, Deputy Admin., Off. of Info. & Regul. Affs.) (noting that internal analysis
“suggest[ed] that about 80% of proposed rules receive 10 or fewer comments”).
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will tend to vary from agency to agency and rule to rule. As a general matter,
a “mass comment response” will feature at least an order of magnitude
increase (e.g., 10x) in the number of comments received vis-à-vis a typical
rulemaking for that agency.48 We use the term “mass comment campaign” to
refer to the special case of a mass comment response in which one or more
organizations has successfully urged a large number of individuals or groups to
submit comments to the agency or allow those organization(s) to submit
comments in their names.49 Mass comment responses and mass comment
campaigns have grown in frequency and scope as information and
communication technologies, including e-mail and the Internet, have reduced
the cost of participating in the notice-and-comment process.
2. Malattributed Comments
Much of the outraged reaction to the net neutrality rulemaking focused
not on the sheer number or redundancy of the comments but on the fact that
millions were submitted under false names, purporting to be from someone
who either did not exist or had no awareness of the comment. We term
comments falsely attributed to persons by whom they were not in fact
submitted “malattributed” comments.50
New technologies similarly facilitate malattributed comments. Easy
access to very large data sets of personal information makes the task of
malattributing comments much easier than in the past. In addition, it is
possible to automate the malattribution of comments, using simple software
applications coupled with publicly available information such as Department
of Motor Vehicles listings or voter registration data.

48. Admittedly, this definition is somewhat arbitrary. There is no accepted definition of
a “mass comment response,” and we adopt this working definition for purposes of this Article
based on our interviews with agency officials.
49. See Balla, Beck, Meehan & Prasad, supra note 1.
50. The more common term is “fraudulent comment.” See Michael Herz, Fraudulent
Malattributed Comments in Agency Rulemaking, 42 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 10–12 (2020), for a more
complete discussion of possible labels, including “fraudulent,” “fake,” “pseudonymous,”
“fabricated,” “inauthentic,” and “misattributed.” A false name can be seen as just one
instance of false statements in comments generally. We address that larger problem briefly
below, but our focus is on the false identity issue alone. The question of how agencies should
respond to false information included in the body of a comment is also important, but it is
only tangentially related to challenges created by new technologies, which are the focus of this
Article. The malattribution problem, by contrast, has been greatly accentuated by the
development of new technologies.
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3. Computer-Generated Comments
The notice-and-comment process invites interested persons to submit
their views on proposed rulemakings. A tacit assumption of this invitation is
that a human commenter will write the text contained within a public
comment. This assumption can be violated when a software program is used
to generate the text. We define “computer-generated comments” as those that
are generated by a software algorithm, thus replacing both human content
generation and human interaction with the agency. Although a human must
create the software to accomplish this task, once automated, that individual
need not further engage in the commenting process and, instead, the software
can submit comments via Regulations.gov, possibly even repeatedly.51
Advances in automated text creation enable computer-generated
comments. To date, computer-generated comments have been fairly crude
cut-and-pastes that are easy to detect. However, researchers in the field of
natural language processing (NLP) continue to make striking progress.
Although the first computer program attempting to mimic human
conversation was introduced in the mid-1960s,52 in recent years more
sophisticated software is making it possible to produce comments that seem
to be unique and written by humans, when they are actually produced by
machines. Contemporary algorithms have achieved results that are difficult
to distinguish from human writers.53 If similar (or more advanced) systems
were used to generate public comments, they could overwhelm an agency
with an arbitrarily large number of human-quality comments. The creators
of a recently developed artificial intelligence technique for generating
human-like text known as GPT-3 recognized this risk, including “abuse of
legal and governmental processes” among the potential misuses of text
generation tools.54 A recent experiment involving computer-generated
51. Many malattributed comments are also computer-generated comments, but neither
is a full subset of the other. Some concerns—for example, that they make it look as if more
people are submitting comments or taking a particular position than is in fact the case—may
apply to both. Our discussion of malattributed comments, however, focuses specifically on
the malattribution, not the fact that it is often done by a computer. And our discussion of
computer-generated comments focuses on the source of the comment, not the fact that it may
well attach a false identity to the submission.
52. See Joseph Weizenbaum, ELIZA—A Computer Program for the Study of Natural Language
Communication Between Man and Machine, 9 COMMC’NS. OF THE ACM 36, Jan. 1966, at 36.
53. See, e.g., Tom B. Brown, Benjamin Mann, Nick Ryder, Melanie Subbiah, Jared
Kaplan, Prafulla Dhariwal, et al., Language Models are Few-Shot Learners 5 (July 22, 2020)
(unpublished report) (on file at arXiv.org), ARXIV:2005.14165 (discussing the GPT-3
autoregressive language model).
54. Id. at 35.
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comments submitted in response to a proposed Medicaid waiver, which we
describe below, gives a glimpse of the potential of this technology to produce
realistically human comments in the rulemaking process. 55
Such advances need not necessarily be problematic. One can envision
computer-generated comments that add value to the rulemaking process. For
example, a program could review an agency’s published proposed rule for spelling
errors, broken links, and other simple errors and then file a comment in the
relevant docket to provide a report of these errors. In this example, the program
is not providing input on policy views; it is merely providing technical assistance.
In addition, there may be more sophisticated ways to bring the benefits of
big data and artificial intelligence to the comment process. In the same way
that credit card companies can offer fraud alerts to individual cardholders
when purchasing activity is unusual, perhaps there are ways for people to
leverage technology to assist them in producing draft comments based on the
interests they have expressed through their purchasing habits or other
administrative data. There are plenty of operational, privacy, and other
issues to consider, but we raise it here as a possibility that may caution against
overly restrictive approaches to computer-generated comments.56 To the
extent that these types of tools could help overcome the collective action
problems that inhibit public participation in the rulemaking process, they
could offer a useful path forward.
B. Challenges Posed by Technology-Enabled Comments
All three types of comments we discuss in this Article affect the
rulemaking process. We explore in more detail below the specific
challenges posed by mass, malattributed, and computer-generated
comments. But, first, it is important to note that these technologyenabled comments are not an entirely new phenomenon.
With respect to mass comments, there were high-salience rulemakings
that generated substantial numbers of public comments prior to the advent
of online commenting. For example, in the Food and Drug Administration’s
1995–1996 rulemaking, in which it first asserted regulatory authority over
tobacco cigarettes, it received over seven hundred thousand paper
comments, many of which were identical, so-called “post card” comments.57
55. See infra text accompanying notes 198–205.
56. Two of this Article’s co-authors expanded on these themes. See Bridget C.E. Dooling
& Michael Livermore, Bot-Generated Comments on Government Proposals Could Be Useful Someday,
SLATE (June 21, 2021), https://slate.com/technology/2021/06/bot-generated-commentson-regulatory-proposals-could-be-useful.html.
57. Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco
to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,418 (proposed Aug. 28, 1996). As
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Yet orchestrating a campaign to mail in masses of comments was much
more burdensome and expensive than it is now. Once it became possible
to comment with the click of a button, mass participation, both
spontaneous and orchestrated, became much more straightforward—as
did the potential for duplicative comments. 58
Similarly, it has always been the case that a commenter could sign a
phony name to a comment or include other falsehoods in the comment.
But the digital availability of personal information, automation tools, and
online submission makes it much easier to submit such comments at scale.
And the difficulty of identifying misleading or mislabeled comments is
heightened in a deluge of comments.
Even computer-generated comments could, in theory, have been submitted
on paper. Automated text-generation software has existed since the 1960s,
and it would be a trivial task to print out computer-generated text and place it
in the mail. Again, however, the shift to electronic submissions—alongside
tremendous advances in artificial intelligence and NLP in recent years—
facilitates and reduces the costs of submitting comments written by computers.
All three of these types of comments can generate serious challenges to
agencies, raising a pressing set of questions concerning how best to respond
while preserving a functional rulemaking process. We now turn to exploring
what is at stake with mass, malattributed, and computer-generated comments.
1. Information Quality
Agency rulemakings often touch on important areas of social and
economic life and can have complex and difficult-to-anticipate effects.
Agencies bring considerable internal expertise to the task of crafting rules,
and officials can also often draw on published research. However, there is
often useful information that an agency might not have readily at hand
during its deliberations, and a benefit of notice-and-comment rulemaking is
the public’s opportunity to bring such information to the agency’s attention.
the Food and Drug Administration described it:
Altogether, the agency received more than 700,000 pieces of mail, representing the
views of nearly 1 million individuals. Most of the submissions were form letters or post
cards. The agency identified more than 500 different types of form letters. Others
were petitions with sometimes hundreds of signatures. More than 95,000 submissions
expressed individual comments on the 1995 proposed rule, including more than 35,000
from children who were overwhelmingly supportive.
Id. (footnote omitted).
58. See Beth Simone Noveck, The Electronic Revolution in Rulemaking, 53 EMORY L.J. 433,
441–42 (2004) (expressing concern that new technology might open the floodgates to “noticeand-spam” rulemaking).
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Often, the most useful information for an agency will be technical or
operational. This type of information includes scientific or engineering
studies, relevant data, analysis about how well the proposed regulatory
change will address the problem being solved, what kind of changes
compliance will require, or legal or policy analysis. Technical or operational
information empowers agency decisionmakers to anticipate the
consequences of the choices they face in designing regulations. Information
along these lines facilitates higher-quality rulemakings, where quality is
understood in terms of technical or operational proficiency.
A second type of information concerns conclusions drawn by stakeholders
or members of the public concerning the desirability of a rulemaking.59
Under the APA, agencies must consider relevant substantive arguments
offered by commenters in support of their conclusions.60 But the status of the
ultimate evaluation offered by a commenter is less clear. There is a debate
among administrative law scholars concerning the extent to which agencies
should consider commenter preferences. Cynthia Farina, for example, has
argued that the deliberative and technical nature of the rulemaking process
makes consideration of pure expressions of preference inappropriate,
especially if they are not informed or representative.61 Nina Mendelson, by
contrast, has argued that expressions of preference can and should be
considered by agencies, at least in some contexts, because agencies are often
called on to “decide values and policy questions left unresolved by their
authorizing statutes.”62 For Mendelson, concerns about representativeness,
59. See, e.g., Coglianese, Kilmartin & Mendelson, supra note 43 (emphasizing the potential
side effects of focusing only on increasing participation and transparency in agency rulemaking).
60. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
61. Cynthia R. Farina, Mary Newhart, Josiah Heidt & CeRI, Rulemaking vs. Democracy: Judging
and Nudging Public Participation that Counts, 2 MICH. J. ENV’T & ADMIN. L. 123, 137–39 (2012).
62. Nina A. Mendelson, Rulemaking, Democracy, and Torrents of E-Mail, 79 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1343, 1350–51 (2011) [hereinafter Mendelson, Rulemaking, Democracy]; see also Nina A.
Mendelson, Should Mass Comments Count?, 2 MICH. J. ENV’T & ADMIN. L. 173, 181 (2012)
(“Agency officials might pay attention to large volumes of comments, for example, to help
gauge public resistance or anticipate significant opposing views.”). This debate tracks, in
certain respects, the scholarly conversation on whether courts should accept “political
reasons” as justifications for agency decisions. See Jodi L. Short, The Political Turn in American
Administrative Law: Power, Rationality, and Reasons, 61 DUKE L.J. 1811, 1816 (2012) (arguing that
“political reason giving . . . is likely to erode the social mechanisms that shape agencies as
organizations and that discipline their day-to-day activities”); Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing
“Political” Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1127 (2010) (suggesting
that some political reasons might be legitimate but legitimacy can only be determined through
a transparent rulemaking process); Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and
Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 84 (2009) (arguing that political reasons have a place in
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for example, must be balanced against the drawbacks of ignoring the
sentiments of those who have taken the time to comment.63
Setting aside this debate, there are also substantive limits on the kinds of
information that agencies may consider in the course of rulemaking.64 Under
the State Farm formulation, “[n]ormally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and
capricious if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to
consider.”65 There are many examples where courts have found limits on agencies’
ability to consider certain factors. For example, in Whitman v. American Trucking
Ass’ns,66 the Court found that the EPA may not consider costs when setting the
National Ambient Quality Standards under the Clean Air Act.67 Accordingly,
public preferences concerning whether the benefits of more stringent air quality
standards outweigh the costs are not relevant under American Trucking.68
Mass, malattributed, and computer-generated comments can make it
difficult to extract both technical/operational and preference information
from the notice-and-comment process, but the potential challenges for
preference information are greater. With respect to technical/operational
information, the identity of the commenter (even whether the commenter is a
human being) and how frequently that information appears in the record will
often not be relevant. The primary challenge raised by mass, malattributed,
and computer-generated comments is that useful technical/operational
information may be difficult to find within a large flood of comments.

arbitrary and capricious review—granted the agency openly discloses them in the rulemaking
record). More broadly, the debate about the appropriate role for consideration of expressions
of preference in public comments tracks alternative views about the legitimate foundations of
administrative decisionmaking. See generally Vanessa Duguay, Views or Votes: The Challenge of
Mass Comments in Rulemaking, 26 GEO. MASON L. REV. 625 (2018) (discussing the justification
for dismissing public approval in rulemaking through different models of legitimacy); Steven
P. Croley, Public Interested Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 7, 7 (2000) (exploring the
limitations of interest group theory in the regulation and what rulemaking initiatives make
broad-based regulation possible); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the
Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511 (1992) (arguing that civic republicanism theory is
consistent with assigning broad policymaking discretion to administrative agencies).
63. Nina A. Mendelson, supra note 62, at 175, 177.
64. See Stuart Minor Benjamin, Evaluating E-Rulemaking: Public Participation and Political
Institutions, 55 DUKE L. J. 893, 906–07 (2006) (“Many statutes leave no room for an agency to
consider public sentiment.”).
65. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)
(emphasis added).
66. 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
67. Id. at 465.
68. See id. (holding that the EPA could not take into account cost saving factors when
calculating air quality standards).
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Preference information, by contrast, would only be relevant inasmuch as it
relates to the views of a genuine person, making it necessary to separate bot
and malattributed comments from those that are genuinely submitted by a
person. Further, for rules that result in a mass comment response, agencies
face a range of difficult questions, discussed in more detail below, concerning
the representativeness of the pool of commenters and the role of intermediary
groups that conduct mass comment campaigns.69
Finally, information is valuable only if it is accurate. When a comment contains
false or erroneous statements, intentional or otherwise, it can, at the very least,
create a distraction for the agency and possibly delay the comment’s processing.
If the falsehood is important and undiscovered, it could negatively affect the
substance of the final rule. From the outset, one concern about e-rulemaking has
been that it would lead to agencies being deluged with misinformation.70 The
agency personnel we interviewed reported that misinformation in comments has
not been a major problem to date. Presumably this is for at least two reasons.
First, agencies are repositories of significant expertise. That means they will often
recognize substantive errors in comments or at least know enough to realize that
further investigation is required. Second, broad participation is a prophylactic
against misinformation; the false submission might be countered by a true one,
often multiple true ones. This is not to dismiss all concerns about false submissions,
which may be seen as a growing concern, but it is a reminder that a falsehood in
a comment is only a small first step toward a substantive error in a final rule.
2. Legitimacy
The concept of legitimacy is complex and its full exegesis is beyond the
scope of this Article. We focus on the potential effects of mass, malattributed,
and computer-generated comments on positive (or sociological) legitimacy,71
as distinct from normative or moral legitimacy.72
69. See discussion infra Section III.B.
70. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the Information Age, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 115, 172
(2004) (“The promise of cyberdemocracy with a fully informed and engaged populace could give way to
‘spam,’ misinformation, and dialogue among the uninformed that diminishes thoughtful deliberation.”).
71. Questions concerning the sociological legitimacy of the state reach back to the foundations
of contemporary social sciences. See Max Weber, Die drei reinen Typen der legitimen Herrschaf, 187
PREUSSISCHE JAHRBÜCHER 1, 1 (1922) (appearing later as Max Weber, The Three Types of Legitimate
Rule, 4 BERKELEY PUBL’NS IN SOC’Y & INSTS. 1, 1–2 (1958) (Han Gerth trans.)). These questions arise
for all governmental bodies but are particularly pressing for those with more tenuous relationships
with the electoral process. Cf. Jeffery J. Mondak, Policy Legitimacy and the Supreme Court: The Sources and
Contexts of Legitimation, 47 POL. RSCH. Q. 675, 690 (1994); James L. Gibson, Understandings of Justice:
Institutional Legitimacy, Procedural Justice, and Political Tolerance, 23 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 469, 471 (1989).
72. Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787,
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There is a considerable body of behavioral and social scientific research
on the causes of positive legitimacy, which concerns empirical questions
related to public acceptance of the exercise of government power.73 One
important thread of that literature concerns perceptions of “procedural
fairness” and the components of decisionmaking processes that tend to
enhance or undermine those perceptions.74 In a recent Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development report by E. Allan Lind and
Christiane Arndt summarizing some of this literature, the authors identify
“[t]hree general elements of process . . . [that] stand out in terms of their
impact on whether a citizen will feel fairly treated in his or her interactions
with government . . . voice, polite and respectful treatment, and
explanations.”75 The authors define voice as “a chance [for affected people]
to present their views” along with “some indication that the input was
actually given consideration.”76 According to this review of the literature,
voice “remains the most extensively researched and arguably the most
powerful antecedent of perceived procedural fairness.”77
The relationship between voice and the notice-and-comment process is
obvious—the APA requirement that agencies solicit and consider the views
of interested persons maps exactly onto the definition of voice offered by Lind
and Arndt. Based on current research in the field, there is reason to believe
that the notice-and-comment process enhances the positive legitimacy of
agency rulemaking, particularly when compared to an imagined
counterfactual in which there is no consistent opportunity for the public to
comment or such comments are not considered by agency decisionmakers.78
Malattributed and computer-generated comments may undermine the
confidence of members of the public in their ability to have their voices
heard. Observers reasonably worry that computer-generated comments
submitted at scale could drown out comments from real persons, create
confusion on relevant issues, or prompt an agency to ignore even legitimate
comments.79 For malattributed comments, the risk is that they could be
1790 (2005); Paul Weithman, Legitimacy and the Project of Political Liberalism, in RAWLS’S POL.
LIBERALISM 73 (T. Brooks and M. Nussbaum eds. 2015).
73. See, e.g., James L. Gibson & Michael J. Nelson, The Legitimacy of the US Supreme Court:
Conventional Wisdoms and Recent Challenges Thereto, 10 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 201 (2014).
74. E. Allan Lind & Christiane Arndt, Perceived Fairness and Regulatory Policy: A Behavioural
Science Perspective on Government-Citizen Interactions 20 (Org. Econ. Coop. & Dev., Working Paper
No. 6, 2016), https://doi.org/10.1787/24140996.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See id. at 21.
79. See, e.g., Fake It Till They Make It, supra note 3, at 9 (statement of Paulina Gonzalez-
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perceived as hijacking or expropriating a person’s voice. These issues will be
discussed in more detail below.
Mass comments present other questions concerning their interaction with
voice and perceptions of procedural fairness. Lower costs of submitting
comments and broader public participation creates more widespread
opportunities for voice. But if comments contain information that agencies
may not or do not consider—including expressions of preference—it is not
clear that the process will ultimately enhance perceptions of procedural
fairness. As noted by Lind and Arndt, “[R]esearch on voice makes it clear
that it is not enough just to allow for more raw input or comment: There must
also be some indication that the input was actually given consideration.”80 A
mismatch between commenter expectations and agency treatment of
comments raises serious concerns, which are discussed in more detail below.
It is worth emphasizing that for purposes of positive legitimacy, perceptions of
procedural fairness matter, irrespective of how well those perceptions map onto
reality. For example, even if agencies are able to easily sort through bot or
malattributed comments, these phenomena could lead to misimpressions about
the integrity of the system that undermine public confidence in the process.81
Experience with the FCC’s net neutrality rulemaking demonstrates that the
public comment process can become publicly salient without warning, with the
associated risks of sensational commentary and the potential for people to draw
inferences about the entire process based on an exceptional example.82
Brito, Executive Director, California Reinvestment Coalition) (stressing the need to ensure
that community voices are not drowned out by fabricated comments fraudulently submitted
in favor of industry); Bob Barr, Massive Fraud in Net Neutrality Process Is a Crime Deserving of Justice
Department Attention, TOWNHALL. (Dec. 20, 2017, 12:01 AM), https://townhall.com
/columnists/bobbarr/2017/12/20/massive-fraud-in-net-neutrality-process-is-a-crime-deser
ving-of-justice-department-attention-n2424724 l (“[B]efore too long, the voices of real people,
expressing genuine opinions on regulations, will be drowned out and ignored all together by
those in power.”); Eric T. Schneiderman, An Open Letter to the FCC, MEDIUM (Nov. 21, 2017),
https://medium.com/@NewYorkStateAG/an-open-letter-to-the-fcc-b867a763850a
(objecting that “the perpetrator or perpetrators attacked what is supposed to be an open public
process by attempting to drown out and negate the views of the real people, businesses, and
others who honestly commented on this important issue.”).
80. Lind & Arndt, supra note 7475, at 20.
81. “The last thing we need is a common view that essentially the entire rulemaking
process is being gamed by a variety of machines and shadowy players.” Nicole Ogrysko, GSA
Launches Public Campaign to Battle Bots, Fake Comments from Online Rulemaking Forums, FED. NEWS
NETWORK (Jan. 31, 2020, 4:45 PM) (quoting Michael Fitzpatrick, head of global regulatory
affairs for Google), https://federalnewsnetwork.com/management/2020/01/gsa-launchespublic-campaign-to-battle-bots-fake-comments-from-online-rulemaking-forums/.
82. See discussion infra Section V.B.
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In addition to perceptions of procedural fairness, scholars have identified
an alternative source of positive legitimacy: it flows from the outcomes of
government decisions themselves.83 The basic idea is that high quality,
effective government decisionmaking leads to public acceptance. If mass,
malattributed, or computer-generated comments reduce regulatory quality
by, for example, making it more difficult for agencies to extract useful
information from the notice-and-comment process, then, over time, they
could erode confidence in agency decisionmaking.
3. Processing Costs
It takes time and resources to review, analyze, respond to comments, and
use the insights to recraft the rule. When there is a small number of
comments, those costs are relatively low. As the number of comments grows,
processing costs can be expected to increase. For example, agencies
sometimes hire outside contractors to help process comments, which helps
alleviate the processing burden, but adds to the overall expense. 84 When
agencies do this work in-house, the review process, albeit important,
consumes significant staff time.85 Similarly, if agencies must spend resources
to identify malattributed or computer-generated comments, that only further
increases processing costs. Time spent sorting out mass, malattributed, and
computer-generated comments can also delay the process and takes time
away from other productive policymaking activities.
When the informational and legitimacy-conferring benefits of comments
are high, then the time invested may be well worth their processing costs.
Nevertheless, the direct financial and delay costs of spurious or low-quality
comments are nontrivial and worth keeping in mind.
III. MASS COMMENTS
Large volumes of public comments present both opportunities and challenges
for agencies. On the one hand, participation in the notice-and-comment process
demonstrates substantial interest in agency rulemaking, which creates occasions for
meaningful engagement between agencies and the public. Public comments can
also contain helpful information that agencies can use to improve their rulemakings.
On the other hand, large volumes of comments are burdensome to process and
digest, increase the risk of missing important arguments or information, and may
make it more difficult to extract overall patterns in the content of comments.
83. See, e.g., FRITZ SCHARPF, GOVERNING IN EUROPE: EFFECTIVE AND DEMOCRATIC? 11
(1999) (distinguishing “input-oriented” and “output-oriented” forms of democratic legitimacy).
84. Bridget C.E. Dooling, Legal Issues in E-Rulemaking, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 893, 901 (2011).
85. Id.
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As noted above, for purposes of this Article, we distinguish between a mass
comment response and a mass comment campaign.86 The latter is a special
case of a mass comment response in which an individual or organization
successfully urges a large number of individuals to file comments that express
a similar set of views or positions.87 Often, comments made in response to a
mass solicitation contain identical or nearly identical language.88 The soliciting
organization may post a sample comment and encourage the submitter to file
the comment verbatim but include a sentence or two at the end explaining
how the rule personally affects the submitter. It is also possible that soliciting
organizations may encourage submissions of unique—if substantively
similar—comments. In such cases, it may be difficult to disentangle a mass
comment campaign from a more spontaneous mass response.
A. Legal Issues Raised by Mass Comments
Courts have had many opportunities to visit the question of how agencies
must consider information generated during the notice-and-comment
process. In one early and important formulation, the D.C. Circuit’s Home
Box Office, Inc. v. FCC89 opinion provided the following standard:
In determining what points are significant, the “arbitrary and capricious” standard of
review must be kept in mind. Thus only comments which, if true, raise points relevant
to the agency’s decision and which, if adopted, would require a change in an agency’s
proposed rule cast doubt on the reasonableness of a position taken by the agency.
Moreover, comments which themselves are purely speculative and do not disclose the
factual or policy basis on which they rest require no response. There must be some
basis for thinking a position taken in opposition to the agency is true. 90

A few years previously, in the canonical Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus91
decision, Judge Leventhal expressed a similar sentiment, writing that
“comments must be significant enough to step over a threshold requirement
of materiality before any lack of agency response or consideration becomes
of concern.”92 More recently, the D.C. Circuit stated the point this way: “An
agency is not obliged to respond to every comment, only those that can be
86. See discussion supra Section II.A.1.
87. See Balla, Beck, Meehan & Prasad, supra note 1.
88. Dooling, supra note 84, at 901.
89. 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
90. Id. at 35–36 n.58; see Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. FAA, 988 F.2d 186, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(citing HBO, 567 F.2d at 35–36 n.58 for standard); Nat’l Shooting Sports Found., Inc. v. Jones,
716 F.3d 200, 215 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (also citing HBO, 567 F.2d at 35–36 n.58 for standard).
91. 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
92. Id. at 394. This language continues to be cited by courts to express the relevant standard.
See, e.g., Am. Great Lakes Ports Ass’n v. Zukunft, 296 F. Supp. 3d 27, 53 (D.D.C. 2017).
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thought to challenge a fundamental premise.”93
Courts have repeatedly noted that agencies are required to consider the
substance of comments: “An agency need not respond to every comment, but
it must ‘respond in a reasoned manner to the comments received, to explain
how the agency resolved any significant problems raised by the comments, and
to show how that resolution led the agency to the ultimate rule.’”94 There is
no obligation to respond to comments per se.95 Rather, “[t]he failure to
respond to comments is significant only insofar as it demonstrates that the
agency’s decision was not ‘based on a consideration of the relevant factors.’”96
A corollary to this focus on the substance of comments has been a tendency
to deemphasize the importance of the number of comments received. The
D.C. Circuit has stated directly that agencies are under “no obligation to take
the approach advocated by the largest number of commenters,”97 and there is
a broad consensus that the public comment process is “not a vote.”98 Where
courts have explicitly considered the number of comments received by an

93. MCI WorldCom, Inc. v. FCC, 209 F.3d 760, 765 (D.C. Cir. 2000); see also Am.
Mining Cong. v. EPA, 907 F.2d 1179, 1187–88 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“[I]n assessing the reasoned
quality of the agency’s decisions, we are mindful that the notice-and-comment provision of
the APA . . . ‘has never been interpreted to require [an] agency to respond to every comment,
or to analyse [sic] every issue or alternative raised by comments, no matter how
insubstantial.’”) (quoting Thompson v. Clark, 741 F.2d 401, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
94. Action on Smoking & Health v. Civ. Aeronautics Bd., 699 F.2d 1209, 1216 (D.C.
Cir. 1983) (quoting Rodway v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 514 F.2d 809, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1975)); see
South Carolina ex rel. Tindal v. Block, 717 F.2d 874, 885 (4th Cir. 1983) (“The purpose of
allowing comments is to permit an exchange of views, information, and criticism between
interested persons and the agency.”).
95. Sherley v. Sebelius, 689 F.3d 776, 784 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“[A]n agency’s failure to
address a particular comment or category of comments is not an APA violation per se.”); United
States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252 (2d Cir. 1977) (“‘We do not
expect the agency to discuss every item of fact or opinion included in the submissions made
to it in informal rulemaking.’”) (quoting Auto. Parts & Accessories Ass’n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d
330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968)).
96. Thompson, 741 F.2d at 409 (quoting Citizens to Pres. Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402, 416 (1971)); see also Covad Commc’ns Comm’n v. FCC, 450 F.3d 528, 550 (D.C. Cir.
2006) (citing Thompson, 741 F.2d at 409).
97. U.S. Cellular Corp. v. FCC, 254 F.3d 78, 87 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see also Nat. Res. Def.
Council, Inc. v. EPA, 822 F.2d 104, 122 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting that rulemaking is not
a process where “the majority of commenters prevail by sheer weight of numbers”).
98. Herz, supra note 44, at 369–74; see also Dooling, supra note 84, at 901 n.33 (discussing
the importance of a comment’s threshold requirement of materialiy); Tips for Submitting Effective
Comments, REGULATIONS.GOV 1, https://www.regulations.gov/document/FS-2018-00530007 (last visited Feb. 19, 2022) (“The comment process is not a vote.”).
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agency,99 it has not been in the context of evaluating the reasoned basis for an
agency’s decision to choose one approach over another.
Although courts have emphasized the importance of substance over
volume in evaluating agency responses to public comments, there is no
general bar against agencies relying on information contained in form
comments. For example, the plaintiffs in Resident Councils v. Leavitt100 argued
that a regulation was invalid because the vast majority of the supportive
comments on the proposed rule were form letters and the agency’s reliance
on them was therefore unwarranted.101 The court disagreed, stating that
“there is no reason the Secretary was not entitled to rely on such letters in
promulgating the regulations.”102 The court followed up by stating that just
because numerous people “share the same opinion and pooled their efforts
does not undermine their intended show of support.”103
99. For example, in North Carolina Growers’ Ass’n v. United Farm Workers, the court found
that a truncated comment period with substantial content restrictions was inadequate, in part
relying on the small number of comments received compared to a prior related rulemaking.
N.C. Growers’ Ass’n v. United Farm Workers, 702 F.3d 755, 770–71 (4th Cir. 2012); see also
Cal. ex rel. Becerra v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 381 F. Supp. 3d 1153, 1176–79 (N.D. Cal.
2019). Some courts have also looked to the number of comments received during the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) review process to determine whether a project is
“controversial” and therefore requires a full environmental impact statement, although there
is disagreement over the relevance of the scale of public reaction to that inquiry. Sierra Club
v. Bosworth, 510 F.3d 1016, 1032 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Given the large number of comments,
close to 39,000, and the strong criticism from several affected Western state agencies, we
cannot summarily conclude that the effects of the Fuels CE are not controversial.”); see also
Greenpeace Action v. Franklin, 14 F.3d 1324, 1333–34 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that an
“outpouring of public protest” along with a “substantial dispute . . . as to size, nature, or effect”
of a proposed action can demonstrate that the action is controversial and therefore requires an
environmental impact statement (citations omitted)); Emily M. Slaten, Note, “We Don’t Fish in
Their Oil Wells, and They Shouldn’t Drill in Our Rivers”: Considering Public Opposition Under NEPA and the
Highly Controversial Regulatory Factor, 43 IND. L. REV. 1319, 1320 (2010) (arguing that public
reaction should be considered in determining whether a project is controversial in light of
“growing criticisms of NEPA, recent attention given toward advancing public participation in
NEPA, and increasing environmental justice concerns”) (citations omitted).
100. 500 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2007).
101. Id. at 1029 n.5.
102. Id.
103. Id. See Morales v. Lyng, 702 F. Supp. 161 (N.D. Ill. 1988), for another discussion on
the role of form comments. In this case, the Department of Agriculture was found to have
acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner by choosing to generally ignore certain
comments. The Secretary of Agriculture argued that the ignored comments were “endless
clones of conclusory statements.” Id. at 163. However, the court found that by choosing to
ignore these comments that offered a differing view than that chosen by the agency, the agency
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B. Policy Issues Raised by Mass Comments
Mass comment responses raise many policy issues, whether or not they
are a part of an organized comment campaign. Many researchers found that
a large percentage of the comments received in mass comment responses are
not highly substantive, but rather contain general statements of support or
opposition.104 As mentioned above, there is some debate concerning whether
and to what extent agencies should consider comments that contain only
statements of preference.105
The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the U.S. Senate’s
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee has
recommended that Congress consider amending the APA to provide
guidance to agencies on the extent to which they should consider the volume
of comments in favor of or in opposition to a proposed rule.106 Guidance
from Congress could be helpful to agencies in deciding when, if ever, they
should take the number of comments and the sentiment expressed in the
comments into account when finalizing a rule.
Inasmuch as public opinion is relevant for a rulemaking, comments
generally do not provide a reliable metric of the views of the broader public.
Commenters are an entirely self-selected group, and there is no reason to
believe that they are in any way representative of the larger public.
Relatedly, the group of commenters may represent a relatively privileged
group, with less advantaged members of the public less likely to engage in
this form of political participation.107
had impermissibly “failed to consider important aspects of the administrative record and
hence the issue itself.” Id.
104. Thomas A. Bryer, Public Participation in Regulatory Decision-Making: Cases From
Regulations.gov, 37 PUB. PERFORMANCE & MGMT. REV. 263, 263 (2013) (analyzing EPA and
Department of Health and Human Services rulemakings and finding that many comments
were “emotional, illogical and lacking in credibility”); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Don’t “Screw Joe
the Plummer”: The Sausage-Making of Financial Reform, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 53, 58 (2013) (contrasting
industry comments on the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Volcker Rule, which were
“meticulously drafted, argued, and researched” with “citizen letters [which were] short and
provide little evidence that citizen commenters even understand, or care, what proprietary or
fund investment is, much less the ways in which agency interpretation of the Volcker Rule’s
complex and ambiguous provisions might govern such activities”); Stuart W. Shulman, The Case
Against Mass E-mails: Perverse Incentives and Low Quality Public Participation in U.S. Federal Rulemaking,
1 POL’Y & INTERNET 23 (2009) (arguing the many comments lack substantive merit).
105. See supra Section II.B.1.
106. Joint Hearing Subcommittee Report, supra note 12, at 3.
107. See Beth Simone Noveck, The Electronic Revolution in Rulemaking, 53 EMORY L.J. 433,
455 (2004) (suggesting that without hiring lawyers or lobbyists, the wider public may be viewed
as unable to participate usefully).
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There are also questions related to the actual influence of mass comment
responses on agency decisionmaking. There is considerable social science
literature that examines the public comment process and how it affects
regulatory outcomes.108 An important early paper by Marissa Golden found
that business interests tended to dominate the rulemaking process, but that
the overall influence of comments was low.109 Subsequent work has found
that, at least under certain conditions, agencies sometimes do make changes
in response to comments.110 Among the factors that have been found to
affect commenter influence is the degree of sophistication in the comments
and the source of the comment.111 Studies of mass commenting in particular
have found that agencies tend to be fairly unresponsive to mass comment
108. For an overview of this literature, see Susan Webb Yackee, The Politics of Rulemaking
in the United States, 22 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 37 (2019). An important general point is that other
mechanisms for interested parties to affect agency decisionmaking, such as ex parte
communications during the pre-proposal stage, may be more influential than the public
comment process. See Jeffrey J. Cook, Crossing the Influence Gap: Clarifying the Benefits of Earlier
Interest Group Involvement in Shaping Regulatory Policy, 42 PUB. ADMIN. Q. 466 (2018); Susan Webb
Yackee, The Politics of Ex Parte Lobbying: Pre-Proposal Agenda Building and Blocking during Agency
Rulemaking, 22 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 373 (2012).
109. Marissa Martino Golden, Interest Groups in the Rule-Making Process: Who Participates?
Whose Voices Get Heard?, 8 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 245 (1998). That study involved
analysis of comments received by three agencies (EPA, Department of Housing and Urban
Development, and National Highway Traffic Safety Administration) to a set of eleven
rulemakings. Id. at 245. Generally, Golden finds that “business commenters” dominated the
public comment process, as “[b]etween 66.7 percent and 100 percent of the comments received
were submitted by corporations, public utilities, or trade associations.” Id. at 252–53. However,
Golden did not find a large substantive impact from the business community’s participation; she
attributed this lack of influence in part due to the fact that “business did not present a united
front[;] . . . [t]here were frequently divisions within the business community.” Id. at 262.
110. Amy McKay & Susan Webb Yackee, Interest Group Competition on Federal Agency Rules, 35
AM. POL. RSCH. 336 (2007); Susan Webb Yackee, Sweet-Talking the Fourth Branch: The Influence of
Interest Group Comments on Federal Agency Rulemaking, 16 J. PUB. ADMIN. RSCH. & THEORY 103 (2006).
111. Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 411
(2005) (identifying three instances in which agencies modified proposals in light of submissions
from non-business commenters); Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, A Bias Towards
Business? Assessing Interest Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy, 68 J. POL. 128, 133–35 (2006)
(finding that agencies consistently alter proposals to reflect comments from business interests
but not others). One article observes: “The relatively high value placed on hard data in
comments is best summed up by the interviewee who stated, ‘We look at every comment; we
consider every comment. But unless there is data supporting the position, it’s just not that
useful in the rulemaking process.’” Keith Naughton, Celeste Schmid, Susan Webb Yackee &
Xueyong Zhan, Understanding Commenter Influence During Agency Rule Development, 28 J. POL’Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 258, 270 (2009).

74.1 BALLA_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

3/4/2022 7:15 PM

2022]RESPONDING TO MASS, COMPUTER-GENERATED, AND MALATTRIBUTED COMMENTS 121

campaigns,112 and, to the extent they ever refer to the number of comments
received in favor of or in opposition to a rule, they do so in opportunistic
ways.113 Some have argued that the reality that agencies are unlikely to alter
rules in response to less substantive comments provides a reason to discourage,
or at least “not actively facilitate[,] public participation” of this sort.114
Direct influence may not be the only motivation behind comments, and
advocacy groups may solicit mass comments for many different reasons.
Research on mass comment campaigns suggests that different groups carry
out such campaigns to promote a range of goals, including calling public
attention to a rulemaking.115 Others have pointed to internal organizational
goals—such as increasing membership, raising financial contributions, and
moving members up the “ladder of engagement” towards greater
involvement—as a motivation for efforts to mobilize actions like petitionsigning and sending public comments.116
112. Balla, Beck, Meehan & Prasad, supra note 1, at 1 (finding that agencies give mass
comments limited attention in the preambles to final rules and that “regulations are generally
not consistent with changes requested in comments, a lack of association that holds especially
for mass comment campaigns”). Some observers have identified cases where mass comments
(at least arguably) influenced regulatory outcomes. See Lauren Moxley, E-Rulemaking and
Democracy, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 661, 692–95 (2016) (attributing change in FCC’s 2015 final net
neutrality rule to large number of and consensus among commenters).
113. See Herz, supra note 44, at 372–73 (“When [the agencies’] conclusion has strong
support in the [mass] comments they tend to note that fact, and when it does not they tend to
glide over it.”) (citations omitted); Parrillo, Should the Public Get to Participate, supra note 20, at 71.
114. Farina, Newhart, Heidt & CeRI, supra note 61, at 150 (“A democratic government
should not actively facilitate public participation that it does not value.”).
115. Steven J. Balla, Alexander R. Beck, William C. Cubbison & Aryamala Prasad, Where’s
the Spam? Interest Groups and Mass Comment Campaigns in Agency Rulemaking, 11 POL’Y & INTERNET 460
(2019). The authors find that campaigns organized by regulated entities are more substantive than
campaigns organized by regulatory beneficiaries. Id. at 460. Regulatory beneficiaries sponsored
73% of mass comment campaigns analyzed (87% of campaigns with 1,000+ comments), whereas
regulated entities sponsored 27% of mass comment campaigns (13% of those over 1,000
comments). Id. at 471–72. Campaigns sponsored by regulatory beneficiaries were larger, averaging
15,783 comments, whereas those by regulated entities received an average of 4,345 comments. Id.
at 472. Regulatory beneficiaries stated in interviews that during the Obama Administration, mass
comment campaigns were used to help the EPA justify proposed actions, whereas during the
Trump-era the campaigns were used to cause the Administration to “feel pain” in the media and
public opinion. Id. Regulated entities, on the other hand, stated in interviews that they use mass
comment campaigns to try and counterbalance the mobilization by regulatory beneficiaries. Id.
116. Farina, Newhart, Heidt & CeRI, supra note 61, at 141; David Karpf, Online Political
Mobilization from the Advocacy Group’s Perspective: Looking Beyond Clicktivism, 2 POL’Y & INTERNET 1, 35
(2010) (“[Organizations use] email to mobilize member interest around their top campaign priority,
as a first step in a ladder-of-engagement.”); Shulman, supra note 104104104, at 27–30.
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Scholars have identified several potential problems with mass comment
campaigns. Some have argued that they may be used to distort regulators’
perception of public opinion and may lead to agency cynicism about the
public comment process.117 Mass comment campaigns often involve many
duplicate, or near duplicate, comments.118 Such duplicate comments impose
various real costs on agencies without adding new substantive content to the
rulemaking record.119 The expert consensus that the public comment
process is “not a vote,” appears to conflict with “widely held views among
participating individuals, advocacy groups, and journalists that the public
expression of preferences should and does carry some weight, entirely apart
from whatever substantive justification for those preferences is offered.”120
Cynthia Farina argues that “powerful cultural patterns,” including “the
popular equation in the United States of democratic voice with casting a
vote,” reinforce this “plebiscite assumption.”121 The conflict between public
and expert perception could lead to some commenters operating under a
false understanding of the weight that will be given to their views.
117. Sara R. Jordan & K. Lee Watson, Reexamining Rulemaking in an Era of InternetEnabled Participation, 42 PUB . PERFORMANCE & MGMT. R EV. 836, 856 (2019) (“At the level
of regulatory politics, manufactured salience is the generation by politically or
economically motivated actors of a large number of comments . . . in order to alter the
perceptions of regulators’ ascribed level of salience of a position on a rule.”); David
Schlosberg, Steve Zavestoski & Stuart Shulman, Deliberation in E-Rulemaking? The Problem
of Mass Participation, in ONLINE DELIBERATION: DESIGN , R ESEARCH, AND PRACTICE 133,
143 (Todd Davies & Seeta Peña Gangadharan eds., 2009) (“Interviews with agency rule
writers show that agencies do not value and often openly resent form letters. The EPA,
in fact, simply prints and stores an inaccessible hard copy of all but one example of each
identical or similar mass email.”); Stuart W. Shulman, The Internet Still Might (But Probably
Won’t) Change Everything, 1 I/S 111, 111–12 (2005) (raising concern that agency personnel
would become cynical about mass comment campaigns).
118. Stuart W. Shulman, Whither Deliberation? Mass E-Mail Campaigns and U.S. Regulatory
Rulemaking, 3 J. E-GOV’T 41, 58 (2006) (finding that a very small percentage of mass campaigngenerated comments include unique substantive information); see also Cary Coglianese, Citizen
Participation in Rulemaking: Past, Present, and Future, 55 DUKE L.J. 943, 952–59 (2006) (raising
concern that e-rulemaking will increase number of comments but not range of viewpoints).
119. Benjamin, supra note 64, at 904–05 (discussing costs associated with duplicative
comments); see also Jeffrey S. Lubbers, A Survey of Federal Agency Rulemakers’ Attitudes About
E-Rulemaking, 62 A DMIN . L. R EV. 451, 465–66 (2010) (describing a survey of officials
involved in rulemaking that found a widespread view that e-rulemaking increased total
amount of participation but that there was rarely useful information or new arguments
in the additional comments).
120. Livermore, Eidelman & Grom, supra note 18, at 991–92.
121. Cynthia R. Farina, Mary J. Newhart, Claire Cardie, Dan Cosley & CeRI, Rulemaking
2.0, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 395, 431 (2011).
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The interviews provided a variety of perspectives concerning how
agencies respond to mass comment campaigns and to expressions of opinion
contained in public comments more generally. The agency officials that we
interviewed were uniform in their position that the notice-and-comment
process is not a vote (i.e., agencies do not tabulate comments “pro” and
“anti” and then choose the more popular position), but they have a wide
array of approaches to addressing opinions expressed in comments.
Specifically, there seem to be three approaches taken by different agencies:
(a) opinions expressed in comments are irrelevant—only the factual content
matters; (b) opinions expressed in comments are relevant to the political
perception of the rule and may affect agencies’ activities on the Hill, color
how agency leadership thinks about the viability of a proposed rule, or affect
how agencies roll out a rule if there is significant opposition; and (c) opinions
expressed in comments are relevant insofar as they express popular
sentiment, and agency decisionmakers (especially agency leadership) may
consider that in deciding how to proceed, though it should never be the sole
factor in deciding whether to pursue a particular policy.
Some agencies appear not to track the overall number of comments received
or the number of times a particular comment was received. Agencies are well
aware that organizations orchestrate mass comment campaigns, and it is obvious
that these campaigns will affect the comments the agency receives. Some of the
agency personnel we interviewed viewed the opinions expressed in mass
comment campaigns as mostly amounting to statements of preference.
C. Technological Responses to Mass Comments
Technologies have emerged that help agencies grapple with the large
quantities of duplicative comments that can result from mass or computergenerated comment campaigns.122 Submissions in response to mass
comment campaigns often include many duplicate comments, which existing
software can easily identify. The most important, relevant software is known
as “de-duplication” (or “de-duping”) software. A de-duping program is
software that scans each comment and then compares it to every other
comment that the agency has received.123 The program will then identify
122. See Shulman, supra note 117, at 116.
123. A de-duping program can, of course, only process comments that are in electronic
form. With respect to paper comment submissions, an agency may, in theory, scan the
comments and then use an optical character recognition (OCR) program to convert the file
into an electronic form. See What is Optical Character Recognition (OCR) Technology Software?,
HYLAND, https://www.hyland.com/en/resources/terminology/data-capture/what-is-optica
l-character-recognition-ocr (last accessed Feb. 19, 2022) (describing OCR and how it can
convert paper submissions to electronic forms). The electronic version can then be run
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the degree of overlap between each of the comments and group those
comments that appear to derive from a common source.124 For instance, the
program could flag a comment longer than a few words and with content
that is 90% or more identical to another comment. In these situations, it
may be safe to assume either the submitters coordinated with each other
when preparing their comments or that they both used a common source
document that one or both of them slightly modified (or, as discussed below,
that the comment was computer-generated).125 This pattern arises when an
organization has supplied text to its members and urged them to either
submit the comment verbatim or modify it slightly so that each comment is
largely, if not entirely, identical.126
As discussed in our interviews, de-duping programs allow the agency to
set the threshold at which a comment is flagged as likely being part of a mass
comment campaign. For instance, if the agency sets the threshold at 90%
identity, any comment that has 90% or more of overlapping content will be
grouped with other such comments; any comment that is less than 90% identical
will not. De-duping software only focuses on the actual words in each document
and the order in which they appear.127 For example, if a submitter took a form
comment and changed most of the words to synonyms (e.g., “happy” to “glad”),
the de-duping program would not recognize the comment as being duplicative.
By batching identical and nearly identical comments in this way, deduping software greatly reduces an agency’s burden in processing comments
in rulemakings involving mass comment campaigns. For example, consider
the following hypothetical scenario. An agency issues a proposed rulemaking
regulating Issue XYZ. Organization ABC supports the rule. ABC sends an
email to its members with a request to submit a public comment in support
of the rule to Regulations.gov. The email includes a four-paragraph sample
comment and asks that the commenters include a sentence or two that explains
how Issue XYZ relates to them. Sixty thousand members file a comment, and
about half of them add the extra sentence or two. Organization LMN opposes
the rule and also sends out an email to its members, providing them with draft

through a de-duping program. The integrity of the OCR process depends upon the quality
of the underlying physical document.
124. See Shulman, supra note 104, at 38.
125. See discussion infra Part V.
126. See David A. Karpf, Online Political Mobilization from the Advocacy Group’s Perspective:
Looking Beyond Clicktivism, 2 POL’Y & INTERNET 1, 4 (2010).
127. Ryan Basques, A Layman’s Guide to Fuzzy Document Deduplication, VARIABLE (Jan. 16,
2020), https://towardsdatascience.com/a-laymans-guide-to-fuzzy-document-deduplicationa3b3cf9a05a7 (explaining that de-duping software only searches for 100% similarities,
allowing campaigns to side-step being caught by changing a few words).
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text to submit in opposition to the rule and encouraging them to explain
precisely how the regulation would harm them. Two hundred members file a
comment. Of these filers, 100 submit LMN’s text verbatim, eighty reproduce
that text and add a sentence or two on how the regulation will hurt them, and
twenty reproduce the comment and provide an extensive analysis on exactly
how the regulation would cause a specific set of harms.
When the agency processes the comments received, the de-duping
software will immediately identify these two separate campaigns and batch
the comments. For the ABC campaign, it can simply ignore the 30,000
comments that are 100% identical. Rereading the same text 30,000 times
would be an extravagant waste of time and taxpayer dollars and contribute
no new information to enhance the rule-writing process. And the software
can make short work of the other 30,000 nearly identical comments. After
the de-duping program has identified the comments as deriving from a
common source, an agency official can simply take a quick look at the added
language in each comment and decide if it adds substantive new information.
The process for the LMN campaign is slightly more complicated. The
100 identical comments can be ignored, and the eighty nearly identical
comments can be quickly processed, assuming the added sentences contain
little by way of empirical data. For the twenty comments that contain
extensive additional information, the agency will need to spend more time
with each one. Indeed, they may not even be flagged by the de-duping
software, depending on the extent of the changes (e.g., if the submitter pastes
in a 500-word comment and then adds 500 additional words, the de-duping
program will not flag the comment unless it is set at 50% overlap or lower).
This simple example illustrates two key points. First, de-duping software can
massively decrease the processing burden for agencies. Second, unique or
partially unique comments are much more challenging for agencies to
process than identical or very nearly identical comments. For the latter, deduping software can reduce the marginal processing time for each iteration
of a mass comment to zero (if the comments are identical) or close to zero (if
the comments are almost identical). Such de-duplication software has existed
for well over a decade.128

128. See Shulman, supra note 117, at 124 (exploring the software’s application in
rulemaking in 2009). Our interviews suggested that today most agencies use some sort of deduplication tool, though there is significant variation in how they do so. First, some agencies
use a tool that, up until recently, was built into Federal Docket Management System, the
federal toolkit for searching, viewing, downloading, and reviewing comments on proposed
federal rules. Others have their own program, others use contractors that have de-duplication
programs, and still others allow individual comment processors to use de-duplication tools but
do not have any agency-wide prescribed tool.
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Our interviews suggested that today most agencies use some sort of deduplication tool, though there is significant variation in how they do so. First,
some agencies use a tool that, up until recently, was built into FDMS, the
federal toolkit for searching, viewing, downloading, and reviewing comments
on proposed federal rules. Others have their own program, others use
contractors that have de-duplication programs, and still others allow
individual comment processors to use de-duplication tools but do not have
any agency-wide prescribed tool.
While software makes it easy to spot identical or near-identical comments,
agencies still need to set the policies by which they decide how much overlap
must exist between comments before they qualify as being part of a mass
comment campaign (and therefore do not review them). De-duplication
programs let an agency set the level of overlap (e.g., 90%), and different
agencies use different thresholds, though none appears to require 100%
overlap for something to qualify as being part of a mass comment campaign.
To the extent that a participant in a mass comment campaign adds unique
information (e.g., submits the organizer’s form comment but then adds a
sentence saying “I am personally supportive of this rule because . . . .”),
agencies generally review the unique information, even if the identical
content is batched and treated as a group. Some agencies do not post all
iterations of comments received on Regulations.gov if they qualify as being
part of a mass comment campaign. For instance, certain agencies just post
a representative example.
IV. MALATTRIBUTED COMMENTS
Malattributed comments differ from mass and computer-generated
comments in two critical ways that raise particular legal and policy issues.
First, malattributed comments involve a direct falsehood; the submitter
makes an assertion about its identity that is untrue. Second, they may cause
harm not just to the notice-and-comment process, but to some individuals
outside that process, namely, those whose names have been used. Some have
gone so far as to characterize malattributed comments as a form of identity
theft.129 In this section we examine these and other claims.
A. Legal Issues Raised by Malattributed Comments
Two sorts of legal issues arise with regard to malattributed comments.
First, many people might assume, and some have asserted, that submitting a
129. See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Statement of Commissioner
Jessica Rosenworcel on Identity Theft Affecting Two Million Americans in FCC Record (Dec.
13, 2007), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-348238A1.pdf.
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malattributed comment is illegal, indeed criminal.130 Several members of
Congress have requested that the Department of Justice undertake criminal
investigations and prosecutions.131 In addition, at least two state Attorneys
General launched criminal investigations into the FCC net neutrality
rulemaking.132 The common phrase “fraudulent comment” is an assertion
that the submitter has violated the law. However, some of this rhetoric may
have gotten out ahead of legal realities.
Whether this activity constitutes a crime is central to the appropriate
agency response for three reasons. First, if it is criminal, then one important
federal response would be prosecution, and it would be incumbent on the
agency to refer significant examples to the Department of Justice.133 Second,
if the activity is criminal, then the agency has a stronger obligation to
discourage or prevent it than would be the case if it is problematic but
unregulated. And third, if this is criminal activity, that signals a societal
judgment that the problem here is serious indeed.

130. See, e.g., In the Matters of Nicholas Confessore, 33 FCC Rcd. 11808 (2018); id. at 11821
(Rosenworcel, Comm’r, dissenting) (noting that in the net neutrality rulemaking millions of
“people had their identities stolen and used to file fake comments, which is a crime under both
federal and state laws”); Catherine Sandoval, Reply Comments, In the Matter of Restoring
Internet Freedom, FCC 17-60, at 8 (Aug. 30, 2017) (“False filings based on stolen identities are
neither anonymous speech, nor protected speech; they constitute federal and state crimes.”).
131. Press Release, H. Comm. on Energy & Com., Pallone to Department & FBI:
Investigate Fake FCC Net Neutrality Docket Comments (June 28, 2017), https://ene
rgycommerce.house.gov/newsroom/press-releases/pallone-to-justice-department-fbi-investi
gate-fake-fcc-net-neutrality-docket. The authors have not seen evidence of Department of
Justice action on these requests.
132. Press Release, NY State Off. Att’y Gen., Attorney General James Issues Report
Detailing Millions of Fake Comments, Revealing Secret Campaign to Influence FCC’s 2017
Repeal of Net Neutrality Rules (May 6, 2021), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2021/attorneygeneral-james-issues-report-detailing-millions-fake-comments-revealing.
133. Indeed, the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations report lamented that:
Only one agency contacted by the Subcommittee—the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC)—said that it had referred suspicious activity to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Other agencies, including the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau, the Department of Labor, and the FCC, all were aware of
comments submitted under false identities regarding their rules, but took little action to
address them.
Joint Hearing Subcommittee Report, supra note 12, at 2. In addition, it may be unlikely that the
Department of Justice will undertake criminal prosecutions in this space. See Matthew Miner,
Vice Chairman and Executive Director Administrative Conference of the U.S., Remarks at
the Administrative Conference of the United States and Administrative Law Review
Symposium on Mass and Fake Comments in Agency Rulemaking (Oct. 5, 2018), at 131–33.
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The second set of legal issues arises under the APA.134 Here, the question
is whether the APA requires an agency to rely on malattributed comments,
forbids it to do so, or just has nothing to say on the matter.
Our role is not to reach definitive legal conclusions, particularly as the
directly relevant caselaw is non-existent. Rather, we flag the critical
questions that agencies and prosecutors must confront.
1. Criminal Prohibitions
A number of possible criminal prohibitions might conceivably apply to
malattributed comments—fraud, making false statements, computer crime,
and identity theft.135 The following discussion touches on the two theories
that seem most frequently mentioned.
a. Fraud
The standard definition of fraud has five elements:
(1) a false statement of a material fact, (2) knowledge on the part of the
defendant that the statement is untrue, (3) intent on the part of the
defendant to deceive the alleged victim, (4) justifiable reliance by the alleged
victim on the statement, and (5) injury to the alleged victim as a result.136
Malattributed comments clearly meet some elements of this definition—
for example, they involve a false statement of fact. But several elements raise
real issues. First, the alleged defrauded party is the agency. But it will be
rare that an agency will “rely on” the false identity set out in a comment. For
run of the mill comments, agencies do not “rely on” the identity of the
commenter; they consider it irrelevant and so ignore it. In general, there will
be nothing to rely on; reading a comment that purports to be from “John
Smith,”137 how could the agency “rely on” it really being from John Smith.

134. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 561–570a, 701–706.
135. Possibly relevant federal statutes include 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (mail fraud); 18 U.S.C.
§ 1343 (wire fraud); 18 U.S.C. § 1037 (email fraud); 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act); 18 U.S.C. § 371 (conspiracy to defraud the United States); 18 U.S.C. § 1505
(obstructing agency proceedings); 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (making false statements “in any matter
within the jurisdiction of the executive . . . branch”); and 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028, 1028A (identity
theft). For a full, and skeptical, discussion of the possible applicability of these provisions, see
Herz, supra note 50, at 33–55.
136. Herz, supra note 50, at 34.
137. As 3,997 submissions in the Net Neutrality rulemaking were. Hitlin, Olmstead &
Toor, supra note 5, at 4.
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Where the false identity is recognizable (Barack Obama, Elvis Presley, a wellknown NGO), then it is possible that the agency could conceivably rely on the
putative identity of the submitter, taking it more or less seriously in light of its
source.138 But it will not do so because it will recognize the falsehood. Finally,
if the submitter claims to be someone with relevant personal experience, then
(a) the relevant falsehood is not the name but the content of the submission, and
(b) it would not be reasonable for the agency to meaningfully rely on such
assertions without further investigation or confirmation.
For similar reasons, it could be difficult to satisfy the fifth prong, actual
injury to the defrauded party.139 A loss of public confidence in the
rulemaking process is arguably an injury to the agency, but not the sort of
tangible harm to person or property that fraud generally requires. Finally,
fraud requires that the false statement of fact be material. Again, if the actual
identity of the commenter does not matter, which is often the case, then a
malattribution is not material.
The analysis is similar under the various federal fraud statutes, of which
there are many. Submission of a comment will almost always involve the use
of a wire or of the mails, thus coming within the ambit of the wire fraud140
and mail fraud statutes.141 But both of these statutes require that the
perpetrator be attempting to obtain “money or property” from the defrauded
party. Even if there is an ultimate financial interest, someone attempting to
influence agency policymaking is not trying to obtain money from the agency.142
There is one specific fraud provision that in some circumstances might
reach malattributed comments. For a century and a half, federal law has
made it a crime to conspire to defraud the United States. 143 The current
version, 18 U.S.C. § 371, makes it a crime to “conspire either to commit any
offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency
thereof in any manner or for any purpose . . . .” The courts have read the
italicized language broadly, going beyond common-law fraud and extending
to “any conspiracy for the purpose of impairing, obstructing, or defeating the

138. Herz, supra note 50, at 34.
139. Id.
140. 18 U.S.C. § 1343.
141. Id. § 1341.
142. See Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 26–27 (2000) (concluding “that § 1341
requires the object of the fraud to be ‘property’ in the victim’s hands” and that a state license
does not qualify). If the effort to get the government to give the supposed fraudster a license
is not an attempt to obtain money or property, an effort to get the government to adopt a
particular regulation is not a fortiori. See Herz, supra note 50, at 37–39.
143. See Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 169, § 30, 14 Stat. 484 (prohibiting conspiracy to
“defraud the United States in any manner whatever”).
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lawful function of any department of Government.”144 There still needs to
be some sort of trick or deceit, but using false identities could be such. If the
submitter is attempting to influence the final decision by making the agency
think, for example, that a raft of non-existent individuals support a particular
outcome, the submission can be seen as an attempt to impair the lawful
functions of the agency. Even if it is unlikely to succeed in doing so, that failure
is irrelevant to the existence of a conspiracy to impair, obstruct, or defeat lawful
functions.145 And if the agency is influenced by false information in a
submission, its functions have been impeded or impaired in the sense that it
failed to reach the “right” result. Furthermore, submission of a huge number
of comments—whether malattributed or not—with the purpose of slowing
down the agency could perhaps be understood as an effort to “obstruct.”146
On the other hand, this setting is quite different than those in which
prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 371 are generally brought. These
prosecutions—so-called “Klein conspiracies”—are most common in tax
cases;147 they also arise where there is a legal obligation to disclose
information that a private party has withheld.148 Such conspiracies directly
obstruct agency activities in a way that phony names on comments do not.
Additionally, the difficulty of showing substantial harm to the federal
government or an agency will disincline any prosecutor to pursue such a case.
Finally, the charge here is conspiracy, not fraud, so the usual elements of
conspiracy would have to be shown.
b. Making False Statements
Moving away from fraud-based crimes, the obvious basis for a possible
prosecution is the prohibition on knowingly or willfully making “false,
fictitious, or fraudulent” statements to a federal agency found at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001. This is a sweeping prohibition; unlike fraud, it does not require a
showing of financial or property loss to the government or reliance by the
government.149 Most elements of the crime seem satisfied here.
144. Haas v. Henkel, 216 U.S. 462, 479 (1910) (upholding convictions under this
provision where the defendants had submitted false information to the Department of
Agriculture, thereby skewing its published statistics).
145. Id. at 479–80; 18 U.S.C. § 371.
146. Hass v. Henkel, 216 U.S. at 479.
147. See U.S. Dep’t of Just., Crim. Tax Manual § 23.07[2] (2021).
148. See United States v. Murphy, 809 F.2d 1427, 1431–32 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Where the
regulations implementing the Act [administered by the agency] do not impose a duty to
disclose information, failure to disclose is not conspiracy to defraud the government.”).
149. See United States v. Richmond, 700 F.2d 1183, 1188 (8th Cir. 1983); United States
v. Lichenstein, 610 F.2d 1272, 1278 (5th Cir. 1980).
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Though not “fraudulent,” a malattributed comment does make a “false”
and “fictitious” “statement or representation” in asserting that it is submitted
by someone other than the actual submitter.
The falsehood is knowing or willful. It is true that whoever is
programming the computer or authorizing the submissions does not know of
each specific misidentification, but that person does know that the
misidentifications are being made.
A notice-and-comment rulemaking would seem to be “a matter within the
jurisdiction” of the agency conducting the rulemaking.150
One issue remains: the false statement has to be material, meaning it “has
a natural tendency to influence, or [is] capable of influencing, the decision of
the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed.”151 Use of a false name
is not “material” unless the effect or influence of a comment hinges on who
submitted it. If the agency is taking account only of the content of the
comment, not the identity of its author, then the malattribution seems
immaterial. Using random names from the phone book to misidentify the
source of a comment would in that case not be a material misstatement.152
A subcategory of malattributed comments could potentially violate 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001, however. Suppose a comment falsely claims to be from someone with
extensive relevant expertise and experience—a Ph.D. research chemist, a
twenty-year line employee in the relevant industry, a user of a product the
agency proposes to ban, the owner or renter of property in the neighborhood of
a regulated facility. Because the person’s supposed unique, relevant experience
would give the comment more weight, that misstatement would be material.
And if simply by using a particular person’s name that information about
background could be communicated, then just the false name could be material.
It seems likely that such comments have been filed in federal agency
rulemakings, though instances would be hard to identify. A recent SEC
rulemaking does provide an example, though it arose prior to, rather than in
comments on, the issuance of a proposed rule. In 2018, the SEC held a
roundtable regarding proxy rules and invited follow-up submissions, of
which it received several hundred.153 In announcing the proposed rule, the

150. Compare Herz, supra note 50, at 34, with 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (demonstrating reliance is
required for the elements of fraud-based crimes, but not the crime of making false, fictitious,
or fraudulent statements).
151. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 16 (1999) (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515
U.S. 506, 509 (1995)).
152. See also Miner, supra note 133, at 126 (stating that “proving fraud here is hard to do”
under the materiality requirement in 18 U.S.C. § 1001).
153. Statement of Jay Clayton, SEC Chairman, at Open Meeting on Proposals to
Enhance the Accuracy, Transparency and Effectiveness of Our Proxy Voting System
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Commission Chair, Jay Clayton, invoked several of these:
Some of the letters that struck me the most came from long-term Main Street investors,
including an Army veteran and a Marine veteran, a police officer, a retired teacher, a
public servant, a single Mom, a couple of retirees who saved for retirement, all of whom
expressed concerns about the current proxy process.154

Later reporting put those letters in a different light. All had been
assembled, organized, and written by an industry group funded by
supporters of the SEC proposal.155 The retired teacher did sign her letter but
had not written it; the veterans were the brother and cousin of the chair of
the industry group; the single mom did not write her letter; the retired couple
were the in-laws of the head of the industry group and when contacted had
no recollection of ever writing any such letter; the public servant reported
that she had been contacted by a public affairs firm, that she did not know
what a proxy adviser is, and “[t]hey wrote [the letter], and I allowed them to
use my name after I read it. I didn’t go digging into all of this.”156
Whether the reporting is accurate, and whether any of this violated 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001, the incident does flag the possibility of bespoke comments that make
material misstatements. Those may or may not include the name of the submitter.
The sort of malattributed comments that have generated attention and concern to
date are quite different. They are duplicative and generic, make no representations
as to background or expertise, and do not use recognizable names of experts.
Finally, one of the ways in which malattributed comments can be misleading,
as we discuss below, is that they make it appear that more commenters hold a
particular view than is the case.157 A malattribution could perhaps be a false
statement that is material not because the agency cares who submitted the
comment but because it cares that someone did. This theory turns on the
complicated question, discussed above, of whether and how an agency should
give weight to the number of comments taking a particular position.158
(Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-clayton-201911-05-open-meeting.
154. Id.
155. Zachary Mider & Ben Elgin, SEC Chairman Cites Fishy Letters in Support of Policy Change,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 19, 2019, 10:03 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201911-19/sec-chairman-cites-fishy-letters-in-support-of-policy-change.
156. Id. All in all, the interest group got about two-dozen people with connections to the
organization to submit letters. Id. The group’s president insisted, by the way, that his motherand father-in-law had known about the letter they supposedly submitted: “They are 80-someyears-old . . . . This happened months ago. I’m sure it’s not top of their minds.” Id.
157. See infra Section IV.B.1. This is true of large-scale, computer-generated comments
generally; most malattributed comments are just an example of that phenomenon in which
the computer has attached a random name to the comment.
158. See supra Section III.B.
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2. The Administrative Procedure Act
Two separate issues arise under the APA. First, some have argued that it
violates the APA for agencies to accept malattributed comments and/or fail
to remove them from the docket.159 Put most strongly, the argument is that
if there are a significant number of malattributed comments in the docket the
rulemaking is fatally tainted and must be abandoned. Presumably, on this
reading, the APA imposes an affirmative duty on agencies to prohibit
submission of malattributed comments and to police that prohibition
conscientiously. The second argument is the opposite; it holds that agencies
have an obligation to accept malattributed comments and to give them
whatever weight they deserve.160 On this reading, it would violate the APA
to do exactly what the first reading says the APA requires.
Of course, it could be that both of these readings are mistaken, and the
APA is silent on this matter. On this understanding, an agency could
prohibit their submission and refuse to consider them; but it could also
instead choose to consider them along with all the other comments they
receive, giving each whatever weight it is due.
a. An Obligation to Accept and Consider Malattributed Comments?
The APA requires agencies not just to accept but also to consider
comments.161 Courts have broadened this obligation by requiring that when
issuing a final rule, agencies respond to all significant comments.162
Arguably, these obligations extend to malattributed comments just like any
other comment. To be sure, an agency will frequently conclude that the
comment does not require a response,163 and its malattribution, if detected,
could be one factor supporting that conclusion.164 But under one reading,
the APA would require that an agency accept, review, and, if there is
something important and substantive in the comment, consider and respond
159. See infra Section IV.A.2(b).
160. See infra Section IV.A.2(a).
161. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (providing that agency shall issue a final rule “[a]fter consideration
of the relevant matter presented . . . ”).
162. See, e.g., Del. Dep’t of Nat. Res. & Env’t Control v. EPA, 785 F.3d 1, 15 (D.C. Cir.
2015); Cement Kiln Recycling Coal. v. EPA, 493 F.3d 207, 225–26 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Grand
Canyon Air Tour Coal. v. FAA, 154 F.3d 455, 468 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
163. See Thompson v. Clark, 741 F.2d 401, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (explaining that
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) Section 553(c) “has never been interpreted to require the
agency to respond to every comment . . . no matter how insubstantial.”).
164. Cf. Mendelson, Rulemaking, Democracy, supra note 62, at 1378 (noting that an agency
could “announc[e] that anonymous comments will receive less weight, particularly when such
comments purport to be informed by an individual’s own experience”).
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to a malattributed comment just like any other comment. And if that is true,
agencies could not prohibit submission of malattributed comments or
remove malattributed comments from the docket.
On the other hand, agencies are unquestionably free to impose reasonable
requirements on the form and content of public comments.165 The most obvious
example is that notice-and-comment rulemaking always includes a comment
deadline.166 An agency might consider late-filed comments—different agencies
have different practices.167 But it is universally accepted that an agency can ignore
a late-filed comment simply because it is a late-filed comment.168 To take a more
directly relevant example, agencies can—and many do—prohibit anonymous
comments.169 Prior ACUS recommendations have not taken a position on
whether agencies should or should not accept anonymous comments, but one
recommendation urges each agency to set a clear public policy.170 The premise of
this recommendation, of course, is that it is up to the agency whether it will accept
or reject anonymous comments. And if that is the case with regard to anonymous
comments, then it would seem to be the case for malattributed comments.
The foregoing assumes that an agency has a clearly stated policy regarding
the permissibility of malattributed comments. In the absence of a policy stating
that the agency will not consider such comments, the argument that the agency
must consider such submissions is more plausible.

165. See Dooling, supra note 84, at 905–15 (discussing such requirements, including
civility and not revealing confidential information) (citation omitted).
166. See JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 279 (4th ed.
2006); OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL REGISTER, A GUIDE TO THE RULEMAKING PROCESS 5 (2011).
167. LUBBERS, supra note 166.
168. See, e.g., Mont. Sulphur & Chem. Co. v. EPA, 666 F.3d 1174, 1195–96 n.12 (9th
Cir. 2012) (“[T]he EPA was not required to consider these untimely comments . . . .”)
(citation omitted); Reytblatt v. U.S. Nuclear Regul. Comm’n, 105 F.3d 715, 723 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (concluding that agency need not respond to late comments even if it had indicated that
it would consider them); Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wash. v. EPA, 86 F.3d 1214, 1221–
22 (D.C. Cir. 1996); LUBBERS, supra note 166, at 279.
169. In a 2011 Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) report on agency
practices regarding public comments, Professor Balla found that of the twenty-five agencies he studied,
fifteen (including EPA and several components of the Department of Transportation) allowed
anonymous comments and ten (including the FCC, Securities and Exchange Commission, and
Federal Reserve) required commenters to identify themselves. See Steven J. Balla, Public Commenting
on Federal Agency Regulations: Research on Current Practices and Recommendations to the
Administrative Conference of the United States 22–23 (Mar. 15, 2011) (draft report to the Admin.
Conf. of the U.S.), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/COR-Balla-Report-Circulated.pdf.
170. Adoption of Recommendations, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,789, 48,791 (proposed Aug. 9,
2011) (“The eRulemaking Project Management Office and individual agencies should
establish and publish policies regarding the submission of anonymous comments.”).
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b. An Obligation to “Cleanse” the Docket of Malattributed Comments?
The opposite argument would be that the APA prohibits agencies from
considering malattributed comments, or even that it imposes an affirmative
obligation to weed them from the docket. Such a claim was made by many
observers regarding the net neutrality rulemaking.171
In general, if a comment makes no contribution, the agency does not reject it,
it just ignores it.172 This makes sense. Removing useless comments would require
effort, would be inconsistent with the public’s opportunity to comment in the first
place, and would make it impossible for a reviewing court to review the full record
and determine, among other things, whether the agency had in fact considered
and responded to all significant comments.173 If an agency must purge the docket
of malattributed comments, that must be because their mere presence in the
docket causes affirmative harm that irrelevant or pointless comments do not. It

171. See, e.g., Klint Finley, FCC’s Broken Comments System Could Help Doom Net Neutrality,
WIRED (Sept. 2, 2017), https://www.wired.com/story/fccs-broken-comments-system-couldhelp-doom-net-neutrality (quoting Gigi Sohn as stating that the agency might have an
obligation under the APA to remove fake comments from the docket and that “[a]t a bare
minimum, they should investigate these comments and if they can’t actually remove the
comments, they can and should disregard them as part of their consideration of record”);
Letter from Ellen F. Rosenblum, Xavier Becerra, Matthew Denn, Karl A. Racine, Douglas
S. Chin, Lisa Madigan et al. to FCC 1, 1–2 (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.doj.state.or.us/wpcontent/uploads/2017/12/ag_letter_12-13-2017.pdf (including eighteen state Attorneys
General urging the FCC to delay action because “the well of public comment has been
poisoned by falsified submissions,” which makes it impossible to “listen to the public” as the
APA requires); Letter from Allen S. Hammond, IV & Catherine J.K. Sandoval to Sen. Roger
Wicker et al. (Dec. 13, 2017) http://1x937u16qcra1vnejt2hj4jl-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/
wp-content/uploads/BBIC-Letter-re-false-comments-and-paid-priority-final-Sandoval-andHammond.pdf (“The FCC’s apparent tolerance of allegedly criminal behavior in its comment
process [in the form of acceptance of malattributed comments] falls far below the required
standard of reasoned decisionmaking under the Administrative Procedures [sic] Act.”) (citation
omitted); see also Katherine Krems, Note, Crowdsourcing, Kind of, 71 FED. COMM. L.J. 63, 76–77
(2018) (“When there is false information on the record, this information overshadows real public
comments that reflect public sentiment and contravenes the APA’s procedures meant to properly
inform agencies of public opinion in decision-making processes.”) (citation omitted).
172. Herz, supra note 50, at 21 (“Career rule-writers view their broad job as developing
sound policy and their narrow job as responding to substantively important comments.
Comments that do not require a response are ignored.”).
173. See Dooling, supra note 84, at 917–20. Of course, an agency can set reasonable
requirements—for example of civility or not revealing confidential information—for
comments and police those requirements. Id. at 905–15. But comments in violation of those
requirements are not merely unhelpful, they do affirmative harm. The affirmative harm from
malattributed comments is much less clear, as discussed earlier.
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is hard to pin down precisely what this harm would be. The problematic aspect
of the comment—the false name—is easily ignored by the agency.174 If there is
a harm under the APA, it would not flow from the malattribution per se, but from
legitimate comments being drowned out or misled by the level of actual public
support for a particular position. It is not clear that either of those things actually
occurs. More particularly, it is not clear that they would occur if the agency is
sufficiently aware of the dubious provenance of certain comments to be in a
position to purge them from the docket in the first place.
Perhaps the most potentially problematic malattributed comment would
be a bespoke, sophisticated comment rather than a mass comment that
happens to have a phony name. Consider a comment that purports to come
from the General Counsel of a leading industry player or the head of a
prominent civil rights organization and reads as if it could be legitimate.
Such a “deep fake” comment could sow confusion at the agency and among
other commenters and prompt a perceived need among other stakeholders
to respond. Because of the impact on other commenters, this is the situation
where the argument that the APA requires the agency to remove the
comment—assuming it is aware of the malattribution—seems strongest.
No court has considered any issue regarding malattributed comments and
the APA, even when such a challenge could have been raised. When the
FCC issued its final net neutrality order, opponents promised that they would
challenge the order in court on grounds related to the malattributed
comments.175 Several petitions for review asserted that one of the order’s
legal defects was that it “conflicts with the notice-and-comment requirements
of 5 U.S.C. § 553,”176 but no party actually raised the issue of malattributed
comments to the court during briefing.177
174. Some of the objections to the presence of malattributed comments in the rulemaking
docket rest not on the fact that the comments bear an incorrect name but that they are
computer-generated or fake mass comments—what looks like submissions from thousands of
people is in fact from only one—and therefore misleading with regard to public sentiment.
175. See, e.g., Brian Fung, FCC Net Neutrality Process ‘Corrupted’ by Fake Comments and Vanishing
Consumer Complaints, Officials Say, WASH. POST: THE SWITCH (Nov. 24, 2017), https://ww
w.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/11/24/fcc-net-neutrality-processcorrupted-by-fake-comments-and-vanishing-consumer-complaints-officials-say/
(quoting
Evan Greer of Fight for the Future as stating that “this will absolutely show up in court if we
get there”); see also Karl Bode, The FCC Is Blocking a Law Enforcement Investigation Into Net Neutrality
Comment Fraud, VICE (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/wjzjv9/netneutrality-fraud-ny-attorney-general-investigation (“Expect the agency’s failure to police
comment fraud to play a starring role in these legal arguments to come.”).
176. Petition for Review at 2, Ctr. for Democracy & Tech. v. FCC (D.C. Cir. 2018) (No.
18-1068); Petition for Review at 2, New York v. FCC (D.C. Cir. 2018) (No. 18-1055).
177. The D.C. Circuit’s opinion, which was largely but not entirely in the agency’s favor, does not
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c.

Agency Reliance on Malattributed Comments

The final question is whether it would violate the APA for an agency to
read or to rely on a comment submitted under a false name. The rulemaking
provision itself, § 553, in no way restricts what the agency can consider or
who it can listen to. Rather, any such restriction would rest on the
requirement of “reasoned decisionmaking” embedded in the prohibition on
arbitrary and capricious agency action.178 Such determinations are casespecific. It would not be reasoned decisionmaking to rely on malattributed
comments as a measure of public sentiment or to rely on a comment that
purported to be from an authority in a relevant field when it was not. But if
a comment is relevant, factually accurate, and communicates something of
value, there is nothing arbitrary and capricious in an agency making use of
what it has to offer, regardless of whether the sender put someone else’s name
on it. Thus, there would seem to be no per se rule allowing agencies to rely
or prohibiting agencies from relying on malattributed comments.
B. Policy Issues Raised By Malattributed Comments
In this section, we elaborate on the concerns raised by malattributed
comments, discuss how agencies can discourage submission of malattributed
comments, and consider how they can handle malattributed comments once
they are discovered. At the same time, we acknowledge that a malattributed
comment may nevertheless contain useful content.
1. Misleading the Agency
Because malattributed comments, by definition, contain a falsehood, an
obvious concern is that the agency may be misled. The misleading might
take either of two forms: (a) the agency could be misled about the identity of
the commenter and (b) the agency might be misled as to public opinion,
mistakenly viewing the phony comments as indicators of broader public
support for a particular position than actually exists. 179
a. Commenter Identity
Concerning the first, in general, the agency simply will not notice the
name of the commenter. If the agency receives 10,000 very similar,
computer-generated comments, no one is paying attention to the names
under which they are submitted, whether they are false or real. One cannot
mention the malattributed comments issue. See Mozilla Corp. v. FCC, 940 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
178. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a).
179. See Herz, supra note 50, at 22–23.
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be misled by something of which one is unaware. If the submission is not
computer-generated—a unique comment filed under a false name—the
falsehood is irrelevant for purposes of the agency’s deliberation. The agency
will take the comment for what it is worth; the name adds nothing to its
weight and will not affect how it is treated.180
Now suppose the name is one that someone in the agency recognizes.
This is the “deep fake” scenario described above. For example, it may be an
important researcher or advocate in a relevant field, or the general counsel
of a prominent regulated entity. In this situation, the identity of the
commenter may matter for the agency’s deliberations. The agency could
give particular weight to such a comment, but it would be highly unlikely for
the falsehood to go unnoticed. The very background knowledge that makes
the name recognizable will make it hard for someone to pull the deception off.
This is especially the case in a situation where the purported commenter’s
interests are well known to the agency, perhaps because of repeat interaction.
However, for an agency that does not regulate often, or that regulates only in
certain domains infrequently, this might be harder to ensure.
The malattributions that often grab observers’ attention involve using the
name of a famous (sometimes dead) person. But these are not misleading
because it is apparent that the name is false. For example, in the net
neutrality rulemaking, there were multiple submissions from “Barack
Obama” and from “Ajit Pai.”181 This does not result in any actual deception;
no rulemaking official would think that the former President or the FCC Chair
had submitted the comment. Same for submissions from “Elvis Presley.”
Our discussions with agency officials are consistent with the foregoing.
Their own sense is that consequential instances of pseudonymous
submissions are extremely rare, if not nonexistent. Of course, we have not
done a thorough study and by definition the victim of a successful deception
is unaware of having been deceived. Nonetheless, we credit these statements
180. See, e.g., Letter from Ajit Pai, Chairman, FCC, to Rep. Michael E. Capuano (Apr.
12, 2018) (“Despite any suggestion that the public comment process was somehow ‘flawed’ or
‘tampered with’ by the alleged submission of comments under false names, any such activity
did not affect the Commission’s actual decision-making . . . .”); Letter from Thomas M.
Johnson, Jr., Gen. Counsel, FCC, to Eric Schneiderman, Att’y Gen., New York (Dec. 7, 2017)
(“[T]he Commission does not make policy decisions merely by tallying the comments on
either side of a proposal to determine what position has greater support, nor does it attribute
greater weight to comments based on the submitter’s identity.”).
181. See, e.g., FCC, Comment Letter on Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Restoring
Internet Freedom (May 11, 2017), https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/filing/1051157755251
(submission from “Barack Obama” of “1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, Washington, DC,”
objecting to the “unprecedented regulatory power the Obama Administration imposed on the
internet” and “Obama’s . . . power grab”).
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because they reflect actual experience, they are consistent with what one would
expect, and we are unaware of a single demonstrated instance to the contrary.
There is one possible setting, however, in which the concerns about the
agency being misled may be more serious. Suppose a comment is not from
a recognizable name but asserts that the submitter has particular experience
that appropriately goes to the weight of the comment. For example, the
commenter claims to have done research in the area, or to possess “situated
knowledge,”182 or to have had direct personal experience, or to be a person
who will be directly regulated or benefitted by the proposed rule. All of those
people possess information that members of the general public do not and
that the agency may find valuable. They may also have a stake that should
counsel caution in taking their assertions at face value. For both reasons, the
agency would want to know who the source of the comment is. An
anonymous comment that claimed to be from a person in such categories
would be somewhat suspect; a signed comment may carry more weight. If
the name is a malattribution, and the actual submitter does not have the
qualifications claimed, there is a real risk of inappropriate reliance on the
comment. Moreover, suppose a rule-writer found that comment helpful but
wanted to double-check its provenance. An Internet search might reveal the
falsehood, but it might reveal nothing, or might appear to confirm the
biographical claims made in the comment.
This risk seems real but slim. We are not aware of real-world examples of
such submissions. That does not mean they have not occurred. In the real
world, the malattributed comments that have gotten attention were duplicative
rather than bespoke; they do not make individualized claims about the
submitter. In addition, the real problem here is not the malattribution so much
as the biographical misrepresentation. The malattribution may make it harder
to uncover the relevant falsehood but is not itself misleading. Thus, the
problem here is actually the distinct one of accuracy in the assertions within
comments. It is entirely possible for commenters submitting under their own
name to misrepresent their experiences, expertise, or even views. The SEC
proxy rule proceeding is an example.183

182. See Cynthia R. Farina, Dmitry Epstein, Josiah Heidt & Mary J. Newhart, Knowledge
in the People: Rethinking “Value” in Public Rulemaking Participation, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1185,
1187–88, 1197 (2012) (describing “situated knowledge” as “information about impacts,
ambiguities and gaps, enforceability, contributory causes, unintended consequences, etc. that
is known by participants because of their lived experience in the complex reality into which
the proposed regulation would be introduced”).
183. See supra text accompanying notes 154–156.
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b. The Weight of Public Support or Opposition to the Proposed Rule
The second concern is that the agency will be misled as to public
sentiment. Malattributed comments are often, though not necessarily,
computer-generated. Such was the case in the net neutrality rulemaking, for
example. Millions of individuals did not sit down and prepare comments
that they submitted under someone else’s name. A handful may have done
so, but presumably almost all the malattributed submissions involved a
computer taking a prepared text, or writing a text, and then randomly
attaching actual names and email addresses to the comment. As with
computer-generated comments, part of the objection is that what looks like
a set of mass comments submitted by millions of concerned individuals is in
fact just the effort of a single submitter. To the extent this is the concern, the
malattribution is largely irrelevant. Perhaps, however, an agency might think
the 100,000 identical comments with different names are more likely to be
from different individuals than are 100,000 identical anonymous comments,
in which case malattributed computer-generated comments are more
misleading. This is especially problematic to the extent that public comments
are understood by agencies as providing insight into public sentiment.
2. Harms to Individuals
Unlike mass and computer-generated comments, malattributed
comments can have impacts outside the agency and the rulemaking process,
imposing harms on the people whose names and email addresses are used
without permission. Many or most will never be aware that they have
supposedly submitted a comment in a federal rulemaking, and many or most
may not care. Even if using someone’s name and address on a comment
does not constitute identity theft under federal law,184 it still may be harmful
to the person whose name is used in this manner.
Two sorts of harms can be imagined. The first is psychological. It would be
understandable that a person who learned that their name was used to submit a
comment would be annoyed or angry, especially if they disagreed with the content
of the comment. The harm is somewhat abstract; unlike standard identity theft, the
victim’s bank account is intact. But for some people, the distress or anger will be
quite real.185 The second possible harm is reputational. For a malattributed
184. See Herz, supra note 50, at 51–55.
185. See, e.g., Letter from Brittany Ainsworth et al., to Ajit Pai, Chairman, FCC (May 25, 2017)
(containing claims from twenty-seven individuals whose names and e-mail addresses were used to
submit comments without their involvement or permission complaining that someone “stole our
names and addresses, publicly exposed our private information without our permission, and used our
identities to file a political statement we did not sign onto” and calling on the agency to remove these
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comment in a regulatory docket to cause reputational harm, it would have to be
noticed by someone who changes their opinion of the purported commenter for the
worse. The obscurity of the rulemaking process may make this unlikely, and we are
not aware of any instance in which it has occurred. Still, all it takes is one viral tweet
by someone with a large following about a comment considered benighted or
outrageous to do serious harm to the ostensible author of the comment. Quantifying
these harms may well be impossible. Individual views on how seriously to take them
will vary. Although some people will not care or perceive themselves to be harmed
at all, others may see themselves as victims of identity theft.
3. Discouraging Malattributed Comments
The eRulemaking Program has taken several recent steps to discourage the
submission of malattributed comments. For example, the user notice on
Regulations.gov now includes the following under the heading “Terms of Participation”:
Public comments help agencies develop regulations; we encourage comments from all
viewpoints. Comments submitted to Regulations.gov should be the submitter’s own
comments or be submitted with the commenter’s permission. The development of federal
regulations is within the jurisdiction of the U.S. Government’s executive branch agencies. It
is a violation of federal law to knowingly and willfully make a materially false, fictitious, or
fraudulent statement or representation including false statements about your identity or your
authority to submit a comment on someone else’s behalf, in relation to the development of
such federal regulations, including through comments submitted on Regulations.gov.
Subject to 18 U.S.C. § 1028(c), it is also a violation of federal law to knowingly use,
without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person in connection with
the violation of any federal law or the commission of a felony under state or local law.
By clicking the submit button, you are verifying that you are not making any materially
false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation regarding your identity or
your authority to submit on someone else’s behalf with regard to the comment you are
submitting on Regulations.gov, and that you are not using, without lawful authority, a
means of identification of another person, real or fictitious, in connection with any
comment you are submitting on Regulations.gov.186

“fraudulent comments” from the docket and notify “[a]ll proper authorities”); Bode, supra note 175
(complaining that “the agency told me there was nothing it could do after someone hijacked my
identity to claim I falsely supported killing net neutrality protections”); Press Release, A.G.
Schneiderman Releases New Details On Investigation Into Fake Net Neutrality Comments (Dec. 13,
2017), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2017/ag-schneiderman-releases-new-details-investigation-fak
e-net-neutrality-comments (quoting, among others, unidentified individual as saying “I’m sick to my
stomach knowing that somebody stole my identity and used it to push a viewpoint that I do not hold”).
186. User Notice, REGULATIONS.GOV (emphases added) (citations omitted),
https://www.regulations.gov/user-notice (last visited Feb. 19, 2022).
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This notice implies that a malattributed comment could be a federal
crime. This may be part of a deterrence strategy on the part of the
government to discourage anyone from sending malattributed comments.
Whether users are likely to see this, in a user notice that contains several other
paragraphs of policies, is uncertain. Moreover, although it may discourage
some individual submitters from using a false name, it is unlikely to have any
impact on large-scale operations.
Agencies have to make decisions about how to treat malattributed
comments, once suspected or discovered. Because of the novelty of this issue,
many agencies do not have protocols for how to resolve whether a comment
is malattributed and, if so, policies on how to handle that comment in the
docket. Such policies would address whether an agency should strive to
resolve a question about a comment’s provenance, or merely flag the
potential issue. Also, and in line with the user notice described above, to the
extent that criminal action is under consideration for particular
malattributed comments, agencies may need to make staff available to assist
with any investigations or prosecutions.
C. Technological Responses to Malattributed Comments
Technology readily exists to authenticate users and is in widespread use in
many contexts. Common techniques include: secure login; two-factor
authentication; biometric authentication using facial recognition or
fingerprint; answering security questions or verifying names against a
database (as is the case in voter registration); and clicking an additional “I
agree” button to acknowledge and agree to terms of service. However,
agencies currently do not have the technology in place to authenticate those
filing comments in the way a government department authenticates someone
applying for a driver’s license or a commercial website authenticates
someone buying a product to prevent credit card fraud.
Although tools are not in place to authenticate someone’s identity, agencies do use
tools to ensure that a commenter is a human instead of a bot. These tools are primarily
a response to computer-generated comments but, by imposing a “speed bump” on
the commenting process, they may also help to reduce malattributed comments.
The addition of reCAPTCHA to Regulations.gov is intended to help to
“improve[] the integrity of the commenting process.”187 CAPTCHA is an
187. Press Release, Gen. Servs. Admin., GSA Launches Updated Regulations.gov to
Improve the Integrity (Feb. 17, 2021), https://www.gsa.gov/about-us/newsroom/news-releases/gs
a-launches-updated-regulationsgov-to-improve-the-integrity-of-public-commenting-02172021#:~:te
xt=WASHINGTON%20%E2%80%94%20The%20U.S.%20General%20Services,gov%20laun
ching%20February%2018%2C%202021.&text=%E2%80%9CThe%20new%20Regulations.gov
%20re,and%20mobile%2Dfriendly%20interface.%E2%80%9D [hereinafter GSA Press Release].
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example of a “Turing Test”—a thought experiment developed by Alan Turing
to evaluate artificial intelligence—and stands for “Completely Automated
Public Turing Test to tell Computers and Humans Apart.”188 With
CAPTCHA, users are presented an image of a set of visually distorted letters
and numbers and asked to enter the same characters into a textbox. The idea
was that machines would not be able to complete this task since only humans
would be able to interpret the distorted characters. With advances in
computing power this is no longer true, and CAPTCHA has evolved. In 2018,
Google announced “reCAPTCHA v.3” which eliminates the need for any
human interaction with CAPTCHA at all.189 By using risk analysis algorithms
that assign a risk “score” to every person browsing a website using the tool, the
software alerts administrators if fraudulent activity is detected.190
Also, Regulations.gov now includes a comment application programming
interface to allow authorized entities to post mass comment campaigns to
Regulations.gov if they have been verified by GSA using a commercial identity
validation service.191 In the press release announcing these changes, GSA
indicated that this was “to assure such entities ‘are who they say they are.’”192 The
service does not aim to verify the identities of individual commenters, however.
The public prominence of malattributed comments prompts a fresh look
at whether agencies should verify commenter identity, either on the frontend or after either an internal or external review flags a comment as
potentially malattributed. Although authentication is a common practice
and technically straightforward in many circumstances, the practice would
be in tension with agency policies to permit anonymous comments.
V. COMPUTER-GENERATED COMMENTS
A. Legal Issues Raised by Computer-Generated Comments
The APA requires agencies to provide an opportunity to comment to
“interested persons.”193 The term “interested” is undefined and is generally
188. CAPTCHA, COMPUTER HOPE (Oct. 11, 2021), https://www.computer
hope.com/jargon/c/captcha.htm. The “imitation game” experiment proposed by Turing
was invented as a way of approaching the hard question of “Can machines think?”. See A.M.
Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, 59 MIND 433, 433 (1950).
189. Introducing reCAPTCHA v3: The New Way to Stop Bots, GOOGLE SEARCH CENT. BLOG (Oct. 29,
2018), https://developers.google.com/search/blog/2018/10/introducing-recaptcha-v3-new-way-to.
190. Id.
191. Regulations.gov API, OPENGSA, https://open.gsa.gov/api/regulationsgov/ (last
visited Feb. 19, 2022).
192. See GSA Press Release, supra note 187.
193. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b).
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understood not to limit the scope of potential commenters.194 The term
“persons” is defined as follows: “person includes an individual, partnership,
corporation, association, or public or private organization other than an
agency.”195 When Congress passed the APA, it would not have contemplated
that a computer might send a comment. But the definition is instructively
broad; it is not limited to natural persons, and courts have read the word
capaciously.196 Moreover, because a person must set a computer-generated
comment in motion, the § 551 definition is arguably met in any event.197
As described above, agencies are required to respond to significant issues
raised in comments.198 As of this writing, no courts appear to have interpreted
this requirement in light of computer-generated comments. During the
interviews, agency staff expressed skepticism that a computer-generated
comment would bring content or issues to the rulemaking docket that were not
otherwise raised by other comments. But these staff also expressed their
commitment to reviewing all comments, regardless of origin, to ensure
compliance with their obligations to consider and respond to comments.
It is theoretically possible—if highly unlikely at this time—that a person
would challenge an agency action because of its failure to adequately account
for the substance of a computer-generated comment. Should such
circumstances arise, courts may consider factors such as whether the
petitioner can demonstrate the reliability or authenticity of the computergenerated comment, and whether the comment contains information that is
relevant, unique, and not adequately addressed by the agency.199
It is also possible that authentication technology might automatically
exclude either computer-generated comments or ordinary comments that
raise unique significant issues. If the agency’s obligation to consider and
respond to significant comments does not change in such circumstances,
194. See Herz, supra note 44, at 357–58.
195. 5 U.S.C. § 551(2).
196. See, e.g., O’Rourke v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 684 F. Supp. 716, 718 (D.D.C. 1988)
(holding that “person” includes non-citizens and collecting cases); Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v.
Kissinger, 385 F. Supp. 769, 776 (D.D.C. 1974) (holding that a foreign government or
instrumentality thereof is “person”).
197. 5 U.S.C. § 551.
198. See supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text.
199. In the evidentiary context, courts have managed to assess the admissibility of
electronically stored information (which may include computer-generated information) on the basis
of the Federal Rules of Evidence; for example, proponents must demonstrate the information’s
relevance, reliability, authenticity, and so on. See, e.g., Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D.
534, 538 (D. Md. 2007). This is not to suggest that the Federal Rules apply to administrative
records; rather, this example is offered to demonstrate that courts may find useful analogies that
may be applied consistently with their equitable powers and authority under the APA.
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technological means of identifying computer-generated comments would
have to account for this overarching obligation.
B. Policy and Technical Issues Raised by Computer-Generated Comments
The policy issues raised by computer-generated comments overlap
significantly with those already identified for mass and malattributed
comments. For example, the presence of computer-generated comments
may undermine public confidence in the rulemaking process or draw down
agency resources. Many of the issues presented by computer-generated
comments, however, are technical. First, one issue is the ability of agencies
to identify computer-generated comments. In 2019, an experiment
demonstrated the ease with which bots mimic human speech, therefore
making it difficult to distinguish computer-generated comments from
comments directly submitted by persons.200 The focus of this experiment was
a comment period on a waiver from federal requirements requested by the
Idaho Medicaid program.201 A text generation model was utilized to submit
1,001 comments on the proposed waiver.202 The inputs for this model were
thousands of comments submitted in response to Medicaid waivers
previously requested by a number of other states.203 These inputs were used
to train the model to employ search-and-replace techniques as a means of
generating comments, which were submitted automatically to the Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) at random intervals.204
Following the submission of the computer-generated comments, subjects
were recruited to judge whether particular comments in the docket were
submitted by a bot or human.205 On average, the respondents—all of whom
had previously demonstrated competency in identifying conspicuous bot
texts—correctly classified fewer than half of the comments.206 Performance
was particularly poor in the context of computer-generated comments, in
that less than one-third were correctly recognized.207 These results indicate
that the computer-generated comments were as a general matter plausibly
human, therefore making consistent sorting of such submissions a non-trivial
exercise for the agency. At the conclusion of the experiment, the researcher
200. Max Weiss, Deepfake Bot Submissions to Federal Public Comment Websites Cannot Be Distinguished
from Human Submissions, TECH. SCI. 2 (Dec. 17, 2019), https://techscience.org/a/2019121801/.
201. See id. at 12.
202. Id. at 2.
203. Id. at 12.
204. Id. at 2.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 23.
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revealed the computer-generated comments and requested that CMS
withdraw the bot submissions from consideration.208
These results are consistent with assessments of computer-generated comments
that have occurred outside of the context of experimentation. A variety of analyses
have emphasized that search-and-replace algorithms, and the resulting commentto-comment variation in content, enhance the difficulty of identifying computergenerated comments. As a result, “analysts have struggled to pinpoint” the precise
frequency with which computer-generated comments occur.209
Are there approaches for identifying computer-generated comments in a
systematic manner? The FCC’s net neutrality policy is a good place to turn
in this regard, as researchers have expended considerable energy identifying
computer-generated comments that were submitted in this particular
rulemaking. Note that these approaches entail identifying computergenerated comments in hindsight, as opposed to screening for such
comments during the intake process.
One analysis focused on the text of net neutrality comments, searching for
expressions regularly contained in submissions.210 The analysis discovered
combinations of phrases consistent with the automated deployment of search-andreplace algorithms.211 Take, for example, the following comment excerpt:
“Americans, as opposed to Washington bureaucrats, deserve to enjoy the services
they desire.”212 This sentence repeatedly appeared in comments in numerous
other permutations, with “Americans” replaced by terms such as “people like me”
and “individual citizens.”213 Similarly, “the FCC,” “so-called experts,” and other
analogous phrases substituted for “Washington bureaucrats.”214 One result of this
automation was the submission of large numbers of comments that, while not
identical, conveyed essentially equivalent sentiments.215 Another characteristic of
this process was the brevity of the resulting computer-generated comments.216
Increases in comment length multiply opportunities “for the appearance of ‘tells’
(e.g. repeated words, incorrect grammar, nonsensical sentiment) that the comment
was not created by a human.”217
208. Id. at 26.
209. Krems, supra note 171, at 71.
210. Jeff Kao, More Than a Million Pro-Repeal Net Neutrality Comments Were Likely Faked,
HACKERNOON (Nov. 22, 2017), https://hackernoon.com/more-than-a-million-pro-repealnet-neutrality-comments-were-likely-faked-e9f0e3ed36a6.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. See id.
216. See Krems, supra note 171, at 75.
217. Weiss, supra note 200, at 12.
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Other analyses have examined over-time patterns of the submission of net
neutrality comments with identical and near-duplicate content, an approach
that is useful for identifying mass comment campaigns (regardless of human
or computer submission). One such pattern is the receipt of large numbers
of comments at precisely the same moment.218 Researchers discovered, for
example, that on “nine different occasions, more than 75,000 comments
were submitted at the very same second—often including identical or highly
similar comments.”219 Another pattern is embodied by the submission of the
following comment excerpt: “The unprecedented regulatory power the
Obama Administration imposed on the Internet is smothering innovation,
damaging the American economy and obstructing job creation.”220 This text
occurred in approximately a half-million comments.221 These comments
were submitted at near-constant rates for given periods, which were
punctuated by interludes during which no such comments were received.222
This cycle suggests that bots were turning on and off at specified intervals.223
Another indication of the submission of computer-generated comments was
repetition in email addresses, in particular domains and locations exhibiting
behavior inconsistent with human messaging activity. One firm determined that
millions of comments were the product of websites that produce one-off emails
and are unable to receive messages.224 The FCC also discovered that hundreds
of thousands of emails originated “from the same address in Russia.”225
The regular submission of computer-generated comments was also
suggested by the nature of the information submitted along with the
comments themselves. When humans fill out information, the resulting
inputs are typically inconsistent. For example, name, address, and email
fields are often left blank, and individuals utilize varying formats. In the
218. DAVID FREEMAN ENGSTROM, DANIEL E. HO, CATHERINE M. SHARKEY &
MARIANO-FLORENTINO CUÉLLAR, GOVERNMENT BY ALGORITHM: ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE IN FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 60 (2020), https://wwwcdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/ACUS-AI-Report.pdf.
219. Hitlin, Olmstead & Toor, supra note 4, at 3.
220. Id. at 7.
221. See Chris Sinchok, An Analysis of the Anti-Title II Bots, MEDIUM (May 14, 2017),
https://medium.com/@csinchok/an-analysis-of-the-anti-title-ii-bots-463f184829bc.
222. See id.
223. Id.
224. Grimaldi & Overberg, supra note 7 (“A review of the FCC comments by dataanalytics firm Emprata determined that 36% of the docket, 7.75 million comments, were
attributable to FakeMailGenerator.com, a site that generates one-time e-mails and can’t
receive e-mails. The analysis was commissioned by a group of telecommunications firms that
support the Trump-administration proposal.”).
225. Id.
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context of the “unprecedented regulatory power” comments referenced
earlier, however, fewer than ten submissions failed to contain complete
information.226 Furthermore, these names, addresses, and emails exhibited
unusual similarity in presentation.227 Finally, exceedingly few comments
requested that the FCC provide email confirmation of receipt.228 These
attributes suggest that algorithms, rather than humans, were the immediate
sources of the submitted information.229
1. Current Agency Practices
In the interviews, agency staff expressed their awareness of computergenerated comments having been submitted in a few rulemaking
proceedings. Despite this awareness, the staff we interviewed did not report
systematic approaches to identify computer-generated comments. One
agency discovered computer-generated comments through a Wall Street
Journal report on the rulemaking, as well as the rulemaking team’s
identification of a number of unusual comments.230 These comments
consisted of strings of nonsensical words, which made the agency suspicious
that the submissions were not generated by humans.
Despite the availability of tools discussed earlier under mass and
malattributed comments, implementing approaches to systematically
identify computer-generated comments was not a high priority for the
agencies we interviewed. Agency staff characterized the discovery of
computer-generated comments as requiring substantial effort, a resourceintensive undertaking that is not worth the dedication of agency bandwidth.
In general, the interviews revealed that agencies are not focused on the issue
of computer-generated submissions in and of themselves. Rather, they
indicated greater concern about mass and malattributed comments whose
detrimental attributes may be deepened by computer generation. Despite
this concern, the agency staff we interviewed reported as their primary
concern the need to identify and respond to significant issues that comments
raise, regardless of a given comment’s source.
One reason for the lack of attention to computer-generated comments
may be that agencies are already using de-duplication tools to address mass
comments. Computer-generated comments, in other words, are not seen as
creating problems in rulemaking proceedings other than increasing the
volume of comments received by agencies—thereby turning the matter into
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Hitlin, Olmstead & Toor, supra note 4, at 7; see Sinchok, supra note 221.
See Sinchok, supra note 221.
Id.
See id.
See Grimaldi & Overberg, supra note 7.
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one of mass comment management. As an agency official put it during an
interview, computer-generated comments essentially present agencies with a
de-duplication task. With the utilization of de-duplication software, the
unique content in computer-generated comments can be readily identified.
As this perception indicates, agency staff generally expressed that the
generation of comments by computers is not, in and of itself, an important
attribute of submissions. The point was repeatedly made during the
interviews that it is the substance of comments that matters, as opposed to
the identity of submitters or the volume of comments. Agencies were not
overly concerned that computer-generated comments convey insights that
have not separately been communicated through human comments. That
said, agencies emphasized that they would not exclude a computer-generated
comment based on the source of the submission but would consider whether
it raised significant issues requiring agency consideration.
2. Threat Versus Practice
In sum, there is currently a disjuncture between conceptions of computergenerated comments from the vantage points of technologists and the agency
staff we interviewed. Technologists we interviewed warned of a present—
and especially future—in which computer-generated comments effectively
mimic human content, thereby making prevention and detection an
impossibility. The agency staff we interviewed, by contrast, were not overly
concerned with such scenarios at this time. They saw de-duplication tools as
being adequate for the task and did not seem anxious to experiment with
additional technologies to streamline the comment review process.
Notwithstanding current perceptions, in the years ahead, it will be important
to monitor whether the technologies that enable mass, malattributed, and
computer-generated comments threaten to undermine the perceived
legitimacy of the notice-and-comment process and the ability of agency
officials to make sense of and consider comments thoughtfully.
VI. INNOVATIONS TO ENHANCE PARTICIPATION AND COMMENTING
The foregoing discussion has identified some of the risks associated with
mass, malattributed, and computer-generated comments. These risks are
real, and agencies must undertake appropriate measures to ensure that they
protect the integrity and value of the notice-and-comment process. But
technology can present opportunities as well as challenges. As we have
already seen, agencies extensively use de-duplication software to help them
process mass comment campaigns.231 And this is only a preview of what
231. See supra Section III.C.
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agencies can accomplish with newly emerging technologies. This section
analyzes how agencies can use technology to respond to comments generally,
especially mass comments submitted by either humans or computers. It also
considers how agencies might use technology in the future to enhance and
supplement the notice-and-comment process, separate from what they might
do with respect to mass comments.232
A. Summarization Technologies and Enhancing the Value of Public Commenting
Although our focus has been on mass, malattributed, and computer-generated
comments, an additional salient and urgent opportunity for regulators is using new
technologies to enhance the process of reviewing public comments.233
While our interviews found that agencies are not currently using such tools,
affordable technology is on the horizon to help agencies more easily make sense
of public comments. This technology will not only save agencies’ time, but also
assist them to better analyze, spot patterns in, and understand public comments.
NLP techniques can help comment reviewers both summarize and sort
comments, helping them to extract the most important substantive
information from the comments.234 For example, agencies can use these
techniques to identify those parts of comments that bear on questions that
are of particular interest to rule-writers, or that contain relevant legal,
technical, or operational information.235
232. See generally Beth Simone Noveck, The Innovative State, 150 DAEDALUS, no. 3, 2021, at
121 (exploring how the federal government can use data-processing tools to facilitate diverse
citizen engagement while helping agencies interpret collected data).
233. See Fake It Till They Make It, supra note 3 (testimony of Beth Simone Noveck, Professor
and Director, The Governance Lab, New York University).
234. See Livermore, Eidelman & Grom, supra note 18, at 980 (discussing “needle-in-thehaystack” and “forest-for-the-trees” challenges of mass rulemakings).
235. The field of Natural Language Processing (NLP) encompasses a wide range of
technologies that use computational tools to convert natural language artifacts into a format
that can be processed and analyzed using computational and statistical tools. NLP techniques
include de-duping software as well as:
• Flesch-Kincaid Readability: a measure of the difficulty or clarity of written English.
The readability score of a text is based on the average number of words per sentence
and the average number of syllables per word. Other readability metrics include
the Gunning Fog Index and the Spache Index. Jens Frankenreiter & Michael A.
Livermore, Computational Methods in Legal Analysis, 16 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 39,
43 (2020).
• Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC): a software application that counts “words
in psychology-relevant categories,” such as whether words are associated with
honesty or deception or track individual thinking styles. Yla R. Tausczik & James
W. Pennebaker, The Psychological Meaning of Words: LIWC and Computerized Text
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While still a challenging task, researchers and entrepreneurs have
developed tools for summarization, including shortening and extracting the
most relevant portions of documents. One technique agencies can use to sort
information is topic modeling. In brief, a topic model is a computational text
analysis technique that extracts patterns in the semantic content in a corpus
of documents, generating a list of topics (which are distributions over the
vocabulary in a corpus) and characterizing every document as a distribution
over those topics.236 Topic modeling makes it possible to sort textual
information automatically and quickly into semantic categories.
Both Google and Microsoft announced in 2019 that they had built systems
capable of summarizing an enormous range of texts, including news, fictional
stories, instructions, emails, patents, and legislative bills.237 The MIT Center for
Analysis Methods, 29 J. LANGUAGE & SOC. PSYCH. 24, 27 (2010).
• Plagiarism Detection: a technique for detecting similarity in written texts, with the goals of
identifying plagiarism or copyright infringement. Frankenreiter & Livermore, supra at 44.
• Automated Document Summarization: an application that processes larger texts, or
multiple texts, as inputs with the goal of generating summary texts that convey a
condensed version of the original input texts. Id. at 42–43.
• Sentiment Analysis: a measure of words based on positive or negative valence, as a way
to estimate the opinions or attitudes expressed in a written text. Frankenreiter &
Livermore, supra at 43.
• Topic modeling: a family of computational tools used to discover the latent thematic
structure within a collection of documents. Id. at 44.
• Word Embeddings: a technique for mapping words or phrases into a vector space that
compactly represents semantic content. One technique for generating word
embeddings involved “skip-gram” where a model is trained to use a word to predict
surrounding words in a document. Id.
236. Several sources provide an interested reader with a background in NLP techniques.
See, e.g., Peter Kincaid, Robert P. Fishburne Jr., Richard L. Rogers & Brad S. Chissom,
Derivation of New Readability Formulas (Automated Readability Index, Fog Count, and Flesch Reading Ease
Formula) for Navy Enlisted Personnel, Research Branch Report 8-75 (1975); Adam Feldman,
Opinion Clarity in State and Federal Trial Courts, in LAW AS DATA: TEXT, COMPUTATION, AND THE
FUTURE OF LEGAL ANALYSIS 407, 415–18 (Michael A. Livermore & Daniel N. Rockmore
eds., 2019); Yla R. Tausczik & James W. Pennebaker, The Psychological Meaning of Words: LIWC
and Computerized Text Analysis Methods, 29 J. LANGUAGE & SOC. PSYCH. 24 (2010); BING LIU,
SENTIMENT ANALYSIS: MINING OPINIONS, SENTIMENTS, AND EMOTIONS (2015); David M.
Blei, Andrew Y. Ng & Michael I. Jordon, LATENT DIRICHLET A LLOCATION, 3 J. MACH.
LEARNING RES. 993 (2003); Tomas Mikolov, Ilya Sutskever, Kai Chen, Greg Corrado &
Jeffrey Dean, Distributed Representations of Words and Phrases and Their Compositionality, in
ADVANCES IN NEURAL INFORMATION PROCESSING SYSTEMS 26, 3136 (2013).
237. Patrick Fernandes, Miltiadis Allamanis & Marc Brockschmidt, Structured Neural
Summarization, published at Int’l Conf. on Learning Representations (Feb. 2019),
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1811.01824.pdf; see also Peter Liu & Xin Pan, Text summarization with
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Constructive Communication conducted research on large-scale Twitter data
sets.238 Its Electome project, for example, extracted semantic content from the
entire corpus of Twitter data—billions of tweets—in order to summarize the
core political messages of the day and help drive election coverage.239
Such summarization and sorting processes sometimes combine
automation with human intelligence to make quick work of large data stores
and overcome the biases that arise from using automation alone. Journalists
took advantage of such tools, for example, when they needed to rapidly sift
through the 13.4 million documents that comprised the so-called “Paradise
Papers.”240 Public institutions have also used natural language data
analytical techniques to make sense of social media data. To help the United
Nations Children’s Fund and other actors craft more effective proimmunization messaging programs, researchers set out to monitor social
media networks, including blogging platforms, forums, Facebook, Twitter,
Tumblr, and YouTube.241 They sought to analyze prevalent conversation
themes according to volume, types of engagement, and demographics; to
identify influencers across languages and platforms; and to develop specific
recommendations for improving messaging strategies across languages,
platforms, and conversation themes.242 The research methodology involved
scraping text from conversations on social media platforms in different
languages to summarize and analyze them.243
A State Department project from 2016 shows how agencies might make
sense of rulemaking comments using a combination of artificial intelligence
and human oversight. To improve its passport application and renewal
process, the State Department ran “an online public engagement process to
ask people what improvements they wanted,” receiving almost 1,000
TensorFlow, GOOGLE AI BLOG (Aug. 24, 2016), https://ai.googleblog.com/2016/08/textsummarization-with-tensorflow.html.
238. The Laboratory for Social Machines, which carried out some of this research, was
incorporated into the MIT Center for Constructive Communication in 2021. See LABORATORY FOR
SOCIAL MACHS., MIT MEDIA LAB, https://www.media.mit.edu/groups/social-machines/overview/.
239. See THE ELECTOME, https://www.media.mit.edu/videos/sm-electome-2017-0131/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2022).
240. See Fabiola Torres López, How They Did It: Methods and Tools Used to Investigate the
Paradise Papers, GLOB. INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM NETWORK (Dec. 4, 2017),
https://gijn.org/2017/12/04/paradise-papers/ (describing how data were consolidated to
facilitate the collaborative investigation into the papers).
241. STEFAAN G. VERHULST & ANDREW YOUNG, THE POTENTIAL OF SOCIAL MEDIA
INTELLIGENCE TO IMPROVE PEOPLE’S LIVES 38, GOVLAB (Sept. 24, 2017), https://datac
ollaboratives.org/static/files/social-media-data.pdf.
242. See id.
243. Id. at 38–39.
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suggestions.244 The Department used a third-party software company, which
applied a text-mining algorithm to create summaries.245 Later, the Department
gave the public an opportunity to review the summaries, “adding accountability
but in a way that is efficient.”246 As one of us described before Congress, “[t]he
combination of human and machine intelligence made it faster and easier to
summarize content than using an algorithm alone.”247
To date, application of NLP to public comments in administrative
rulemaking has been largely limited to de-duplication. While still under
development, more advanced NLP techniques could eventually assist agency
personnel in identifying relevant substantive content within comments and
summarizing the information presented across a broad spectrum of
comments. One of the challenges for deploying summarizing technology in
the context of rulemaking is that there is often domain specific language that
requires retraining the relevant models.
However, for important
rulemakings likely to receive a large number of comments, this investment
may well be worth it. Furthermore, the addition of human oversight can
provide a check on the performance of machine learning applications,
making it possible to evaluate and confirm the reliability of new tools for
summarization. While NLP tools can be used to augment, rather than
replace, human review, the agency staff we interviewed expressed concerns
related to how the use of new technologies might interact with their legal
obligation to review and respond to comments. This legal uncertainty
creates the risk that agencies may innovate slowly. Depending on their risk
tolerance, it may prevent them from adopting these technologies at all.
B. Innovations in Equitable Participation
In addition to improving the commenting process ex-post using new
technologies, agencies could also explore using complementary platforms
and processes—ones already well-honed and tested by other governments—
to create new opportunities for public engagement. These approaches could
help solicit information and expertise from more diverse audiences to
complement and supplement the notice-and-comment process. Building on
ACUS’s earlier work, we conclude our discussion of public participation in
rulemaking by looking at several contemporary examples of how
governments are enhancing citizen participation using new technology.248
244. Fake It Till They Make It, supra note 3, at 152 (statement of Beth Simone Noveck,
Professor and Director, The Governance Lab, New York University).
245. Id. at 152–53.
246. Id. at 153.
247. Id. at 153.
248. As Michael Herz wrote in a 2013 ACUS report:

74.1 BALLA_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

154

3/4/2022 7:15 PM

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW

[74:1

Since 2011 with the reauthorization of the America COMPETES Act, 249
a hundred federal agencies have run online challenges via Challenge.gov
to tap the intelligence and expertise of the public. 250 NASA has regularly
used prize-backed challenges to spur crowdsourcing of innovative solutions
from the public. The Asteroid Grand Challenge, for example, focused on
finding all asteroid threats to human populations. 251 Prize-backed
challenges require agencies to articulate and define exactly what
information they need from the public and provide very transparent and
specific criteria for evaluating public submissions. With ten years of
experience administering prize-backed challenges, there may be useful
insights for federal agencies to draw upon to improve public participation
in agency decisionmaking. 252 For example, to the extent that addressing a
particular regulatory problem hinges on the development of an innovative
new method or technology, perhaps prizes could help increase the amount
of private-sector development work aimed at those solutions.
[T]he online world in general has come to be increasingly characterized by participatory
and dialogic activities, with a move from static, text-based websites to dynamic, multimedia platforms with large amounts of user-generated content. At the heart of this move
to “Web 2.0” have been social media, blogs, Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, IdeaScale,
wikis, Flickr, Tumblr, and the like. Outside the rulemaking setting, federal, state, and local
governments have enthusiastically jumped on the social media bandwagon.
MICHAEL HERZ, USING SOCIAL MEDIA IN RULEMAKING: POSSIBILITIES AND BARRIERS 2
(Nov. 21, 2013) (report to Admin. Conf. of the U.S.), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/fil
es/documents/Herz%20Social%20Media%20Final%20Report.pdf.
249. See America Creating Opportunities to Meaningfully Promote Excellence in Technology,
Education, and Science Reauthorization Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-358, 124 Stat. 3982 (Jan. 4,
2011) (reauthorizing an Act to encourage innovation and research across the United States).
250. See About Challenge.gov, CHALLENGE.GOV, https://www.challenge.gov/about (last
visited Feb. 19, 2022) (“Challenge.gov . . . is a leading program that supports federal agencies
to mature and scale the use of prize competitions in order to advance their missions.”).
251. See Asteroid Grand Challenge, NASA, https://www.nasa.gov/content/asteroid-grandchallenge (last visited Feb. 19, 2022) (encouraging public engagement in NASA’s defense activities).
252. Challenge.gov is one example of institutionalized public engagement or what is
sometimes referred to as “CrowdLaw,” namely the use of technology to engage the public in
law, rule, or policymaking. It is the idea that public institutions work better when they increase
citizen engagement by using new technologies to obtain diverse sources of information, insight
and expertise at each stage of the law and policymaking cycle to improve the quality as well
as the legitimacy of the resulting laws, regulations, and policies, especially by engaging with
underrepresented communities. See Victòria Alsina & José Luis Martí, The Birth of the
CrowdLaw Movement: Tech-Based Citizen Participation, Legitimacy and the Quality of Lawmaking, 40
ANALYSE & KRITIK 337, 337–38 (2018) (introducing the concept of CrowdLaw). CrowdLaw
does not describe one form of participation. Rather, it describes a variety of different methods,
tools and platforms that institutions use.
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Expert sourcing, where officials crowdsource expert advice, is one
example of how government bodies are implementing more citizen
engagement. The Federation of American Scientists’ Congressional Science
Policy Initiative invites hundreds of scientists to help draft questions for
Members of Congress to ask of committee witnesses.253 Such crowdsourcing,
facilitated by new technology, helps beleaguered staffers write more informed
questions.
The Governance Lab at New York University uses
videoconferencing to help coordinate online dialogues among experts to
advise government officials on a variety of topics.254 In Fall 2020, for
example, the Governance Lab ran six deliberative sessions at the behest of
seven governments in Latin America to help them develop implementable
strategies for responding to specific public health challenges. 255
Relatedly, some jurisdictions have used online collaborative drafting
processes and platforms to write policies and rules with the public, especially
with expert members of the public. Instead of an advisory committee or
hearing with a handful of experts or writing rules entirely behind closed
doors, online collaborative annotation makes it possible to hear from a
broader and deeper range of experts and to focus their participation on
specific comments on a document. In 2018, the German government used
an annotation platform to “expert source” feedback on its draft artificial
intelligence policy. By putting the draft on Hypothes.is, a free and opensource annotation tool, the German Chancellor’s Office, working in
collaboration with Harvard University’s Berkman Center for Internet and
Society, was able to solicit the input of global legal, technology, and policy
experts. Using an annotation platform also made it possible for people to see
one another’s feedback, instead of a series of disconnected comments. One
could envision an agency using collaborative annotation to invite experts to
annotate and comment on the text of a draft rule.
253. CONGRESSIONAL SCIENCE POLICY INITIATIVE, https://fas.org/congressionalscience-policy-initiative/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2022).
254. See, e.g., NYU Tandon’s Governance Lab Joins Virtual Discussion with Congressional
Subcommittee on Modernizing Congress, N.Y.U. T ANDON S CH. OF E NG’ G (May 11, 2020),
https://engineering.nyu.edu/news/nyu-tandons-governance-lab-joins-virtualdiscussion-congressional-subcommittee-modernizing
(explaining
how
different
governments adapted to virtual videoconferencing forums like Microsoft Teams and
Cisco WebEx to communicate and strategize on effective policies and regulations in the
early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic).
255. See Smarter Crowdsourcing: Coronavirus, S MARTER CROWDSOURCING,
https://coronavirus.smartercrowdsourcing.org (last visited Feb. 19, 2022); see also The
GovLab and the IDB Bring Innovative Ideas to Latin American Government Officials, IDB N EWS
(Sept. 30, 2020), https://www.iadb.org/en/news/govlab-and-idb-bring-innovativeideas-latin-american-government-officials.
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Governments are experimenting with the use of random samples of
members of the public as a mechanism to obtain more legitimate forms of
participation. New technology is making it easier to assemble these
representative samples of citizens, known as mini-publics,256 to weigh in on a
governing process. Small groups are known as citizen juries while larger
random samples are called citizen assemblies. For example, in the BrusselsCapitol region, a random sample of citizen representatives serves on each
parliamentary committee.257 Citizens ask questions and provide advice.258
These processes could also be designed to elicit expertise and know-how
relevant to agency decisionmakers.
Similarly, some have suggested ideas such as administrative agencies
empaneling a thousand randomly selected citizens to provide oversight over
agency decisionmaking.259 A variation on this idea would use citizen juries
to solicit information on agency agenda-setting and priorities,260 providing
the citizen jurors with background materials generated by deliberative
polling before their discussions.261 Alternatively, the agency could convene
a demographically representative group of citizens to consider a particular
issue, and it would then carefully consider their preferred approach.
Finally, instead of selecting a random sample, other institutions have relied
on self-selected participation using a variety of tools. In month-long online
exercises known as “Evidence Checks,” UK parliamentary committees invite
experts, stakeholders, and members of the public to comment on the validity
of evidence on which a policy is based.262 The process begins when
256. Claudia Chwalisz, A New Wave of Deliberative Democracy, CARNEGIE EUR. (Nov. 26, 2019),
https://carnegieeurope.eu/2019/11/26/new-wave-of-deliberative-democracy-pub-80422.
257. Belgian Sortition Models: Institutionalizing Deliberative Democracy, CROWDLAW FOR CONGRESS,
https://congress.crowd.law/case-belgian-sortition-models.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2022).
258. Id.
259. See David R. Arkush, Direct Republicanism in the Administrative Process, 81 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1458, 1462–63, 1494 (2013) (outlining a “practicable” model of direct republicanism in the
administrative process which imagines a system of “direct” citizen engagement in
decisionmaking, beyond simply creating a space for citizens to express their views).
260. BETH SIMONE NOVECK, SMART CITIZENS, SMARTER STATE: THE TECHNOLOGIES
OF EXPERTISE AND THE FUTURE OF GOVERNING 220–21 (2015).
261. See Reeve T. Bull, Making the Administrative State “Safe for Democracy”: A Theoretical and
Practical Analysis of Citizen Participation in Agency Decisionmaking, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 611, 640, 644
(2013) (describing the process by which the group would arrive at a recommendation: they
would receive materials in advance, review the materials prior to a formal meeting, debate the
issues over a period of several weeks or months, and reach a consensus or otherwise vote upon
a recommendation).
262. See UK Parliament Evidence Checks, NESTA, https://www.nesta.org.uk/feature/sixpioneers-digital-democracy/uk-parliament-evidence-checks (last visited Feb. 19, 2022).
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government departments supply information to their respective committees
about an issue. Each committee publishes the information on a
parliament.uk web page, and it is scrutinized by a wider pool of invitees. The
committee also presents specific questions and problems that it would like
participants to address. In contrast to a representative sample, this process
allows a group of people with relevant experience and expertise to identify
gaps in research that require further review.263
Another example of self-selected participation was initiated by the New
Jersey Department of Education in March 2021 when that agency invited
students, parents, and educators across the state to help inform the
Department’s policymaking by responding to questions via All Our Ideas, a
free platform developed at Princeton University.264 All Our Ideas has hosted
over 10,000 wiki surveys.265 The owner of the consultation uses the platform
to write a series of statements that are then randomly presented to the
participant. People select the response they prefer (or “I can’t decide” as a
third answer) or they may submit their own response. As people are
repeatedly selecting between two randomly generated options, it is a faster
and easier mechanism for responding to a series of questions. This so-called
“wiki survey” method of showing people two pieces of information and
having them choose between them and/or submit a new item offers
efficiency benefits over open-ended commenting and can be designed to
draw on participant expertise.266
CONCLUSION
Exactly half a century ago, ACUS adopted a recommendation entitled
Public Participation in Administrative Hearings.267 The project report underlying
263. See id.
264. See Fake It Till They Make It, supra note 3, at 26–29 (testimony of Beth Simone Noveck,
Professor and Director, The Governance Lab, New York University).
265. MATTHEW SALGANIK, BIT BY BIT: SOCIAL RESEARCH IN THE DIGITAL AGE 113–14
(Princeton Univ. Press, 2017).
266. Id.
267. ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATION 71-6, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN
ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS (1971), https://www.acus.gov/recommendation/publicparticipation-administrative-hearings [hereinafter ACUS Recommendation 71-6]. Three
years before, ACUS had recommended federal funding of a “People’s Counsel” that would
“represent the interests of the poor in all Federal administrative rulemaking substantially
affecting the poor.”
ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATION 68-5,
REPRESENTATION OF THE POOR IN AGENCY RULEMAKING OF DIRECT CONSEQUENCE TO
THEM ¶ B.4 (1968), https://www.acus.gov/recommendation/representation-poor-agencyrulemaking-direct-consequence-them. See generally Arthur Bonfield, Representation of the Poor in
Federal Rulemaking, 67 MICH. L. REV. 511, 530–45 (1969) (arguing for such a “Poor People’s
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the recommendation was written by the then-chair of ACUS, Professor
Roger Cramton. Cramton’s report, later published in the Georgetown Law
Journal, broadly endorsed increased public participation in the administrative
process generally, and rulemaking in particular.268 Reflecting the times, the
report and the recommendation gave more attention to formal proceedings
than to notice-and-comment rulemaking. Nonetheless, the recommendation
that agencies make affirmative efforts to increase “meaningful and effective”
public participation specifically included informal rulemaking.269 While
emphasizing the need for broader participation, the recommendation also
expressed concern that “public participation in agency proceedings should
neither frustrate an agency’s control of the allocation of its resources nor
unduly complicate and delay its proceedings.”270
Because of technological developments that no one foresaw decades ago,
opportunities for participation have vastly increased. As in so many settings,
however, these technological gains have not been an unmitigated good.
Throughout the cybersphere, the stunning increases in the availability of
information, the rapidity and ease of communication, and the transparency
of more and more aspects of everyday activity have also created new
vulnerabilities. Notice-and-comment rulemaking is no exception.
This Article has examined three phenomena of contemporary rulemaking
that are examples of how the online process has facilitated forms of
commenting that can clog or perhaps undermine the rulemaking process.
When the three are combined—when an agency receives millions of similar
comments written and submitted by bots that purport to come from individuals
Counsel” and other efforts to ensure that poor people’s interests are heard in rulemakings,
though not through direct participation by the affected persons themselves).
268. Roger C. Cramton, The Why, Where and How of Broadened Public Participation in the
Administrative Process, 60 GEO. L.J. 525, 526–27 (1972). As Cramton saw it, agency policies generally
failed adequately to consider public needs and the public interest. See id at 525. The problem was
not that agencies were unresponsive; rather, it was that they were responsive only to the inputs they
received, which were narrow. See id. at 525, 528–30. The solution, therefore, was to expose
agencies to a broader range of inputs, interests, and information. See id at 528–31.
269. ACUS Recommendation 71-6, supra note 267, at Recommendation A.1. The key
provision reads:
Agencies engaging in notice-and-comment rulemaking should, to the extent feasible:
(a) make available documents, materials and public submissions upon which the
proposed rule is based; (b) invite the presentation of all views so that the agency may be
apprised of any relevant consideration before formulating policy; (c) develop effective
means of providing notice to the affected public and to groups likely to possess useful
information; and (d) if there is a hearing, allocate time fairly among all participants.
Id. ¶A.1.
270. Id. at preamble.
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who had nothing to do with them—something is clearly amiss. Such an
avalanche of problematic submissions may mislead, distract, or overwhelm the
agency, which in turn raises serious concerns about the real and perceived
legitimacy of the outcome of the rulemaking. The FCC’s 2017 net neutrality
rulemaking, which received widespread media attention, stands as the most
prominent example of a rulemaking that struggled with this issue.271
But that particular rulemaking is so well-known because it was unique; it
was an unmatched perfect storm of mass, computer-generated, and
malattributed comments. And even in that case, it does not appear that the
agency was misled or reached a different conclusion than it would have had
the notice-and-comment process not been so anarchic. Furthermore,
focusing on the net neutrality rulemaking and thus lumping these three types
of comments together ignores the distinct characteristics of each. For
example, mass comments pose management challenges but do not threaten
the legitimacy of the process; malattributed comments pose a threat (albeit a
small one) of harm not to the rulemaking process but to third parties;
computer-generated comments are not problematic per se but may pose
issues if they are misleading; and so on.
There is no legal objection to the public’s ability to submit mass comments
to agencies, and even malattributed and computer-generated comments do
not violate the law except in extreme circumstances. The solution here is
likely not criminal prosecution, setting aside any rule that emerges from a
docket that contains these comments, or broad prohibitions on forms of
participation. Agencies should respond to mass, malattributed, and
computer-generated comments not with referrals to the Department of
Justice but in two more modest ways. First, they should develop and
publicize policies that will encourage helpful comments and discourage or
prohibit misleading ones. Second, just as the response to problematic speech
is more speech,272 the response to abuses of new technologies rests on more
technology. Agencies should take advantage of the many software tools that
are increasingly available to screen, sort, de-duplicate, summarize, and digest
submissions. Finally, it is likely that the particular pathologies of the moment
on which this Article focuses will fade as agencies learn to gather public input
through mechanisms using methods in addition to the submission of
271. See Brian Fung, FCC Net Neutrality Process ‘Corrupted’ by Fake Comments and Vanishing
Consumer Complaints, Officials Say, WASH. POST (Nov. 24, 2017), https://www.washingtonp
ost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/11/24/fcc-net-neutrality-process-corrupted-by-fakecomments-and-vanishing-consumer-complaints-officials-say/.
272. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“If
there be time to expose through discussion the falsehoods and fallacies, to avert the evil by the
processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.”).
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comments on proposed rules.
In the five decades since ACUS first endorsed broader public participation,
notice-and-comment rulemaking has become the central mechanism for
agency policymaking, and its particulars have been transformed through
judicial elaboration, legislation, and technological developments. Yet the basic
concerns have remained unchanged: how to ensure that the agency is fully
informed and that all “interested persons” are able to participate but that the
process remains manageable. Mass, malattributed, and computer-generated
comments should be dealt with in light of those basic principles. To this end,
ACUS adopted recommendation 2021-1, which focuses on agency
management of these at once timeless and emerging considerations.273 Based
on our research, we believe that mass, malattributed, and computer-generated
comments do not, at least currently, fundamentally undermine the notice-andcomment process. However, such comments raise issues of sufficient
significance that ongoing attention is warranted, both to mitigate the
difficulties emanating from them, and to consider ways in which technology
presents opportunities to enhance public engagement in rulemaking.

273. Adoption of Recommendations, 86 Fed. Reg. 36,075 (proposed July 8, 2021).
Our recommendations, which we prepared to assist the relevant ACUS committee
formulate its views, are available in our report available at https://www.acus.gov/r
eport/final-report-mass-computer-generated-and-fraudulent-comments.

